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Abstract 
A significant shortfall exists in the medical capability provided to US Service members 
deployed to the African Area of Responsibility because of unknown epidemiology, large 
distances, limited resources, and high patient movement cost.  The first step in closing this gap is 
to understand the types, demographics, diagnoses, and distribution of the patients requiring 
aeromedical evacuation.  This research examined the DoD’s aeromedical evacuation missions 
from Africa between 2010 and 2014.  Of the 274 patients and 170 missions identified from 
available data, a gap is evident in aeromedical evacuation capability with over 23% of Priority 
patients and almost 10% of Urgent patients picked-up beyond the critical 24-hour mark.  A 
decision tree and web-based decision support tool are proposed that identified improper airlift 
choice in 46 of the 170 missions examined.  These decisions cost the DoD $2.6M.  Making better 
aeromedical movement decisions can enable the DoD to reallocate funds to reduce the existing 
medical gap in Africa.  
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EPIDEMIOLOGY, COST, AND AIRCRAFT CHOICE 
FOR AEROMEDICAL EVACUATION IN AFRICOM 
I. Introduction 
The Department of Defense lists Logistics and Force Support as two of their nine core 
competencies (Gates, 2009).  One piece of these skill sets is ensuring adequate medical response 
in the form of aeromedical evacuation.  As such, the DoD maintains personnel and equipment to 
facilitate global patient movement with the primary goal of supporting US military members 
involved in contingency operations (Department, 2012b).  Since 2001, the DoD moved more 
than 150,000 patients in Iraq and Afghanistan (USTC, 2015).  From the aircraft design and 
dispatch centers, to the alliances and partnerships with other nations and civilian corporations, 
the DoD has the capability to move large numbers of patients worldwide. 
General Issue 
Over the last 14 years, the DoD essentially automated patient movement from Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  By building medical treatment facilities in both countries, the DoD created a 
network of medical support that provided surgical care and stabilization in theater.  This 
infrastructure allowed the establishment of aeromedical evacuation channel missions that 
ensured patient movements occurred within the appropriate timeframes as specified by 
regulation (Routine-72 hours; Priority-24 hours; Urgent-ASAP) (Department, 2014).  
Within AFRICOM, however, the current construct of patient movement does not appear 
to support the military to the same level experienced in CENTCOM.  Africa is a large continent 
consisting of 11.7 million square miles and 54-58 countries (Wikipedia, 2015).  Each of these 
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countries has various degrees of stability, economic prosperity, terrorist activities, and 
amenability toward the US.  The US relies on multiple small-scale operations to pursue its 
interests in promoting a stabilized Africa.  As a result, the DoD has a small number of troops 
spread over a very large area, each with limited access to medical or aeromedical evacuation 
support (Whitlock, 2012).  The only base with a surgical medical capability in Africa is Camp 
Lemonnier, located in Djibouti (Schmidt, 2005).   
In the current patient movement system, each Service Component provides its own 
patient movement from point of injury to initial stabilization (Department, 1996).  The 
aeromedical evacuation system then moves “stabilized” patients from one medical treatment 
facility to another.  In many countries, the DoD relies on the local medical systems for this 
support, but the majority of Africa lacks adequate medical infrastructure, requiring the DoD to 
provide its own support (Mullan, et al., 2011).  However, given the sparse nature of troops, the 
complicated political environment, and the high cost to supply medical assets in theater, the DoD 
does not typically provide surgical level medical support to anyone outside the Camp Lemonnier 
catchment area.  As a result, when members become ill or wounded, even small issues become 
unstable and generate a Priority or Urgent Patient Movement Request (PMR) due to the inability 
to treat patients onsite.  At the same time, the Air Force does not man, train, or equip the 
aeromedical evacuation system to move unstable patients.  Therefore, the inability to stabilize 
and hold patients within Africa places unwarranted pressure on the aeromedical evacuation 
system to move patients in an unsafe manner (Department, 2014).  Further complicating the 
situation, the closest military aeromedical evacuation support is located at Ramstein Air Base, 
Germany.  This distance makes it difficult to move a Priority patient within the 24-hour 
requirement, and in most cases, impossible to move an Urgent patient with military aeromedical 
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evacuation assets.  The vast distances, coupled with the high cost to support few troops, and the 
poor state of the local medical infrastructure poses an obvious problem for the traditional 
construct of patient movement planning and execution.  To compensate for this lack of medical 
and aeromedical evacuation support, the DoD relies on civilian air ambulance contracts to fill the 
gap in service.  However, these contracts are expensive and have limited use during contingency 
operations.  Compounding the issue, little analysis exists on the cost, incidence, distribution, 
causes, and requirements for aeromedical evacuation in Africa.  This lack of awareness translates 
to a gap in preparation and planning that is necessary for executing adequate medical support in 
Africa.  
Problem Statement 
Due to the unknown epidemiology, the large distances, limited resources, and the high 
cost to support a sparse number of personnel, there is a significant gap in the medical capability 
provided to US Service Members deployed to the African Area of Responsibility (AOR) as 
compared to other AORs. 
Research Objectives/Research Questions & Hypotheses 
The goal of this research is fourfold.  1) Perform a descriptive epidemiological analysis 
of the types, demographics, and distribution of the diagnosis requiring aeromedical evacuation 
transport in Africa.  2) Calculate the current cost of performing aeromedical evacuation in 
Africa.  3) Develop a decision tool that shows the current gaps and helps planners determine the 
most cost effective aircraft for aeromedical evacuation in Africa.  4) Determine any cost savings 
available through aircraft choice.  This study considers the four most common aircrafts for 
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aeromedical evacuation to include C-130s, C-21s, C-17s, and civilian air ambulances.  It is the 
hope of this research that identifying the epidemiology of aeromedical evacuation brings 
awareness to the lack of medical coverage in Africa and helps planners identify the specific 
medical capabilities and preventative factors necessary to reduce the incidence of aeromedical 
evacuation.  In addition, formalizing the trade-off between the most common aeromedical 
evacuation platforms (C-130s, C-21s, C-17s, and civilian air ambulances) in terms of risk, 
response time, and cost will result in better medical planning factors that can increase the 
efficient allocation of assets and minimize the medical gap experienced by deployed personnel 
on the African continent.  This research addresses the following questions: 
• What is the epidemiology of military aeromedical evacuation in Africa? 
• What is the current cost of aeromedical evacuation in Africa? 
• What is the most cost effective aircraft for aeromedical evacuation in a given 
situation? 
• How much cost can the DoD avoid through proper aircraft choice? 
• Where are the gaps in aeromedical evacuation coverage in Africa? 
Methodology 
The data required to perform the appropriate analysis includes the Patient Movement 
Request records located in the TRANSCOM Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation 
System (TRAC2ES) database controlled by the USTRANSCOM Surgeon General and 
maintained by the Global Patient Movement Integration Center.  This database captures every 
Patient Movement Request made to USTRANSCOM since 2001.  The data include indications 
of the patients’ locations, movement dates/times, precedencies (Routine, Priority, or Urgent), 
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diagnoses, and demographics.  Additionally, this research requires data from the Global Decision 
Support System (GDSS), also controlled by USTRANSCOM.  This system records data from all 
Mobility Air Force missions, to include aircraft type, take-off times, landing times, and ground 
times.  Furthermore, this research requires access to the data from the Air Force Instruction 65-
503, Table A4-1, Logistics Cost Factors Description (Air, 2015).  This table is an Excel 
spreadsheet published by the USAF Financial Management office under the Financial 
Management functional area of the Air Force Portal.  Accordingly, “This table calculates the 
logistic costs by flying hour and primary aircraft authorizations.  It includes supplies, fuel, and 
organic/CLS (contract) maintenance and repair” (2015).  Finally, this research requires access to 
the civilian air ambulance records held by the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center-
Europe.  These records indicate the cost of each civilian air ambulance movement as quoted by 
the firm International SOS. 
In order to conduct this research, I conduct an in-depth review and analysis of all the 
Patient Movement Requests from 2010-2014 within AFRICOM and cross-reference these 
requests with the actual mission data from GDSS.  I then use the data from the Logistics Cost 
Factors Description and the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center-Europe’s records to 
determine the avoidable cost of the current aeromedical evacuation system for AFRICOM.  
Next, I analyze the factors that determine aircraft choice and develop a decision tree that 
minimizes the cost of aeromedical evacuation while maintaining regulated standards of care.  
Finally, I calculate the avoidable cost as if the DoD used the aircraft identified by my decision 
tree. 
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Assumptions/Limitations 
This research assumes that the data reported in the TRAC2ES, GDSS, the Logistics Cost 
Factors Description, and the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center-Europe databases 
are accurate, including the patient diagnoses and the precedence categorization.  This study also 
assumes that the resources (work force, equipment, infrastructure, etc.) supplied by the DoD to 
support aeromedical evacuation are not subject to significant changes in the near future.  The 
applicability of this study is limited to the aeromedical evacuation of US military forces 
deployed to Africa.  As technology, medicine, and the African continent progresses, the factors 
identified in this research may prove insignificant.  
Implications 
This research can help DoD planners by providing a tool to compare various alternatives 
when seeking to allocate scarce resources to their most efficient use.  In addition, this research 
identifies the current epidemiology of aeromedical evacuation in Africa, which can provide 
planners insight on trends and/or deficiencies with AFRICOM medical assets.  Finally, the 
findings of this research can help inform commanders regarding the aeromedical evacuation 
costs and medical risks associated with extending the military’s reach into more remote and 
austere environments.  
In the next few chapters, I will review the pertinent literature regarding aeromedical 
evacuation in Africa.  Then, I will discuss the methodologies used to research my proposed 
questions.  Finally, I will provide the results and analysis of the research, followed by my 
conclusions and recommendations.  
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II. Literature Review 
This literature review establishes the foundation of my study.  The chapter begins with an 
overview of the DoD’s Concept of Operations for patient movement.  After which, I review the 
current and future presence of US forces in Africa as well as the existing state of medical care 
and conditions on the continent.  Additionally, this review describes the methods employed and 
the difficulties encountered by aeromedical evacuation operations in Africa.  Next, this review 
looks at the medical literature to establish the importance of response time as a factor of 
survivability, after which, I look at the existing epidemiological studies concerning aeromedical 
evacuation.  Finally, I examine the literature on costing as well as the development of decision 
tree models. 
Patient Movement Concept of Operations 
In order to provide worldwide patient movement coverage, the DoD divides patient 
movement into various steps, each step falling under the responsibility of different entities, but 
ultimately controlled by USTRANSCOM (Department, 2012b).  USTRANSCOM monitors and 
controls “regulated” patient movement with four Joint control centers known as Patient 
Movement Requirements Centers (PMRCs) (Department, 1996).  These centers, currently 
located in Hawaii, Illinois, Germany, and Qatar, provide 24-hour ability to approve, coordinate 
and track patient movement by coordinating organic aeromedical evacuation, civilian air 
ambulances, ground ambulances, commercial airline tickets, taxicab services, and other 
transportation functions.  A “regulated” patient movement is any patient movement approved, 
monitored, and controlled by a Patient Movement Requirements Center (Department, 2006).  
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While these centers manage all types of patient movements, their focus is on aeromedical 
evacuation.  Aeromedical evacuation is the movement of patients on fixed wing aircraft with a 
designated medical crew between medical treatment facilities (Department, 2014).  The Air 
Force is responsible for all fixed-wing aeromedical evacuation and is only manned, trained, and 
equipped to move “stabilized” patients (Department, 2006).  A stabilized patient is defined 
where the “patient condition may require emergency, but not surgical intervention, within the 
evacuation phase.  Patient’s condition is characterized by secure airway, control or absence of 
hemorrhage, shock adequately treated, and major fractures immobilized” (Department, 2006 p. 
A13).  Numerous complications occur with patients during flight.  Air pressure and temperature 
transients, increased vibrations and decreased oxygen levels are just a few of the many factors 
affecting patients (Parsons, 1982).  Patients on aeromedical evacuation flights experience 
hypoxia and 35% expansion of gases due to a cabin pressure equivalent to 5,000-8,000 feet 
altitude (Essebag, et al., 2003), (Teichman, et al., 2007).  The aeromedical evacuation crews and 
the staff at the Patient Movement Requirements Centers train in high-altitude medicine and have 
the ability to monitor, treat, and compensate for these effects.  Without the experience and 
knowledge necessary, it may be more dangerous to move a patient via air, than to wait in place.  
The Patient Movement Requirements Centers operate 24 hours a day with a medical technician, 
flight doctor (known as the Validating Flight Surgeon (VFS)), flight nurse, and an administrator.  
Once the Patient Movement Requirements Center receives a Patient Movement Request, the 
team discusses the patient with the attending medical personnel to establish a valid need to move 
the patient, determine the best destination, proper manner of travel, and precedence required.  AF 
regulation classifies patient movements into three categories of precedence.  Routine is the least 
serious precedence and requires movement within 72 hours.  Priority is the next level and 
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requires movement within 24 hours, while Urgent is the final category and is reserved for 
patients at risk to lose life, limb, or eyesight and requires movement immediately or as soon as 
possible.  The Validating Flight Surgeon is the final authority on these determinations 
(Department, 2014).     
The DoD differentiates aeromedical evacuation by inter-theater and intra-theater 
movements (Department, 2006).  USTRANSCOM is responsible for inter-theater patient 
movements, while the COCOM commanders are responsible for intra-theater patient movements.  
The type of aircraft used by each command depicts this division.  EUCOM, for instance, 
typically uses C-21s and C-130s for its primary aeromedical evacuation platform.  In 
comparison, USTRANSCOM uses C-17s for aeromedical evacuation (2006).  The AFRICOM 
AOR is an exception to this rule because it is supported by EUCOM aeromedical evacuation 
assets for both inter and intra-theater movements.  Since EUCOM does not control any C-17 
aircraft, they use C-21s and C-130s to support aeromedical evacuation in Africa.  Requests for 
C-17s support must flow to USTRANSCOM for approval (Department, 1996).   
There are several platforms used by the DoD for patient movement.  For aeromedical 
evacuation in Africa, the C-17, C-130, and C-21aircraft are the most common platforms 
(Department, 1996).  For ground, AMBUSs (school buses converted for carrying litters) or 
traditional orange and white ambulances move the majority of critical patients, while privately 
owned vehicles are the vehicle of choice for most well-patient movements.  Army Blackhawks 
or civilian helicopters provide needed rotary-wing resources (Department, 1996).  For staffing, 
the AF maintains 4 Active Duty, 18 Reserve, and 9 Guard Aeromedical Evacuation Squadrons 
(Affairs, 2014).  Each squadron consists of several complements of aeromedical evacuation 
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crews.  A basic aeromedical evacuation crew consists of two flight nurses and three flight 
medical technicians (Department, 2014).  The aeromedical evacuation crews are limited to the 
same duty-day regulations as other aircrew members as shown in Table 1.  A basic duty day is 
14 hours for the C-21 and 16 hours for other aircraft.  The time on the duty day begins one hour 
after the alert.  An augmented aeromedical evacuation crew adds an additional nurse and 
technician.  Augmentation allows them to extend their duty day as shown in Table 1.  The AF 
restricts C-21s to a 14-hour duty day because the small size of the aircraft prevents crew 
augmentation. 
Table 1.  Crew Duty Day and Alert Times (Air, 2011), (Department, 2014) 
 
Crews require a minimum of 12 hours of crew rest prior to their alert time and the 
Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team (AECT) can alert crews up to six hours after their 
scheduled alert time.  En route, crews require a minimum ground time of 17 hours for a RON 
(remain overnight).  These 17-hours include crew rest and alert times (Department, 2014). 
In addition to a standard aeromedical evacuation crew, the Patient Movement 
Requirements Center can identify the requirement for a Critical Care Air Transport Team 
(CCATT).  A Critical Care Air Transport Team consists of a critical care doctor, a critical care 
nurse, and a cardiopulmonary technician (Department, 2015).  Together with the basic 
aeromedical evacuation crew, a Critical Care Air Transport Team provides an intensive care unit 
(ICU) capability to an aeromedical evacuation.  With this capability, the DoD can move critically 
C-17 C-130 KC-135 C-21
Basic Flight Duty Period 16 16 16 14
Augmented Flight Duty Period 24 18 24 N/A
Crew Alert 3:45 3:15 4:15 3:00
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ill or injured patients with “positive patient outcomes” and “fewer patient complications” (2015 
p. 5).  However, Critical Care Air Transport Teams still require local medical personnel to 
provide initial stabilization for patients (2015).  Another manner in which the Air Force is 
attempting to bridge the African medical gap is through the Tactical Critical Care Evacuation 
Team Enhanced (TCCET-E) concept.  The Tactical Critical Care Evacuation Team Enhanced 
was originally designed for Special Operation missions, but a new look at the concept may prove 
useful in Africa (Hatzfeld, 2014).  The team consists of a surgeon, emergency medicine 
physician, two nurse anesthetists and an operating room technician (Svan, 2013).  In essence, the 
Tactical Critical Care Evacuation Team Enhanced aims to create a flying operating room that is 
capable of transporting soldiers from their point of injury, and if necessary perform stabilization 
procedures on the ground and perhaps damage control surgery in the air.  This concept has 
already shown some better results than the traditional approach although the time-distance factor 
remains a limitation (Apodaca, 2013). 
The second division of patient movement, called tactical casualty evacuation (Tacevac, 
Medevac, or Casevac), is the movement of a patient from the point of injury to the point of 
stabilization.  Technically, Casevac and Medevac are both forms of Tacevac, where Casevac is 
the ad hoc movement of patients from the point of injury to a point of stabilization and Medevac 
uses predetermined medical vehicles and personnel (Department, 2006).  However, literature and 
personnel often use these terms interchangeably.  By regulation, each branch of the DoD is 
responsible for providing its own tactical casualty evacuation services (Department, 1996).  This 
construct lends itself to a disorganized, Service specific nature of tactical casualty evacuation, 
where each Service delegates responsibility down to individual units to devise a plan, resulting in 
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improvised solutions rather than a well-constructed systematic approach to patient movement 
(Cecchine, 2001).  
US Military in Africa 
Although Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti represents the US’ only “enduring element” in 
Africa, there are numerous “expeditionary cooperative security locations and contingency 
locations” throughout the continent with a number of high threat posts (Figure 1) (Rodriguez, 
2015 p. 6). 
 
Figure 1.  AFRICOM Travel Map (AFRICOM, 2015) 
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 According to the AFRICOM commander General Rodriguez (2015), the US is 
increasing its presence throughout Africa.  In 2014, the US “conducted 68 operations, 11 major 
Joint exercises, and 595 security cooperation activities,” a 23% increase in activity from 2013 
(Rodriguez, 2015 p. 2).  General Rodriguez (2015) freely admits that requirements in Africa 
outpace the resources provided, leaving significant gaps in capability that require non-traditional 
mitigation.  Figure 2 is an operations overview slide from an AFRICOM briefing that highlights 
five areas representing discernable threats to the US.  These operations span much of the 
continent. 
 
Figure 2.  AFRICOM Operations Overview (AFRICOM, 2014) 
 
The White House agrees that the Africa-US relationship will continue to grow.  
According to the US Strategy toward Sub-Sahara Africa, “Africa is more important than ever to 
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the security and prosperity of the international community, and to the United States in particular” 
(Obama, 2012 p. 0).  While the rapid growth potential of Africa’s population and economies 
makes Africa an asset for the US economy, the widespread political corruption and potential for 
failed states creates an ideal environment for terrorists groups to thrive (2012).  Both reasons 
contribute to Africa’s importance in the international community. 
The number of AFRICOM deployments also shows the increasing US presence.  An 
estimated 5,000 to 8,000 US military personnel are currently present in Africa.  Major General 
Raymond Fox stated that from 2012 to 2014, the number of Marines in Africa increased from 
150 to around 2,000 (McLeary, 2014).  According to Gen Rodriguez, “Africa Command’s 
capability gaps are likely to grow in the year ahead” (Rodriguez, 2015 p. 11).  Among these 
capabilities is that of aeromedical evacuation.  To mitigate these gaps, AFRICOM is looking to 
(2015 p. 11): 
1. Increase collaboration and interoperability with multinational and interagency 
partners to better leverage and support allies and partners. 
2. Refine our posture and presence in Africa and Europe to reduce risk in 
operations to protect U.S. personnel and facilities. 
Given this guidance, the importance of this study is clear.  A need exists to rethink how 
the DoD executes patient movement in order to provide the most efficient, comprehensive 
support to US personnel in Africa.   
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African Medical Capability 
The continent of Africa has some of the poorest healthcare systems in the world (World 
Health Organization, 2006).  Experts estimate that the country is short 2.4 million healthcare 
workers, resulting in only 2.3 medical personnel per 1000 individuals (Naicker, 2009).  In 
comparison, the Americas have more than ten times that amount at 24.8 per 1000 (Table 2).  
Compounding this issue, western sanitary conditions are practically nonexistent on the continent 
(Figure 3) and Africa accounts for approximately 25% of the world’s disease while having only 
1.3% of the medical personnel (2009).  In Africa, infectious diseases cause a startling 69% of 
death and chronic disease mortality rates are among the highest in the world (Aikins, 2010). 
Table 2.  Global Healthcare Workers 
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Figure 3.  Countries with Western Sanitary Standards (Duchateau, et al., 2009) 
 The problem is more dire for many countries, especially those in Sub-Sahara.  As seen in 
Table 3, the majority of the healthcare workers are concentrated in northern African countries 
and South Africa, with many of the remaining countries having less than one doctor per 10,000 
people.  
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Table 3.  Doctors in Africa 
 
 These poor healthcare conditions create a need for aeromedical evacuation that would not 
exist in most other countries.  The inability to locally hold and manage even simple patients 
forces normally Routine Patient Movement Requests into the Priority and Urgent categories.  In 
fact, the results of one regression study found three factors which significantly predicted the need 
for immediate aeromedical evacuation; 1) The patient is less than 15 years old, 2) The patient 
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resided in a country without a “high standard structure” (Figure 4), and 3) The patient resided in 
sub-Saharan Africa (Duchateau, et al., 2009).  As seen, two of the three criteria are functions of 
being in Africa, indicating a strong need for concern toward any US military patient in the 
continent.  As a result, “cases occurring in sub-Saharan Africa demand extreme caution” 
(Duchateau, et al., 2009 p. 394). 
 
Figure 4. Countries with a High Standard Structure (Duchateau, et al., 2009) 
Current Patient Movement Operations in Africa 
In most western countries, the DoD relies on local medical systems for support (Meza, et 
al., 2006).  In Afghanistan, the DoD and Coalition partners have deployed numerous medical 
treatment facilities throughout the country to provide the needed medical coverage (Figure 5).  
Each of these smaller facilities use Army rotary wing for Medevac transport to higher levels of 
care.  The larger facilities have access to fixed wing aeromedical evacuation assets to facilitate 
patient movement to a definitive care facility at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, Germany.  
The density of troops and the relatively small landmass in Afghanistan, allows the DoD to 
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provide a viable “911” type system over the entire country, at a relatively low cost per troop 
(International Security Assistance Force Headquarters, 2011).    
 
Figure 5. Medical Treatment Facilities in Afghanistan 
Africa, however, lacks adequate medical infrastructure (Duchateau, et al., 2009) and due 
to the enormity of the country, deploying a comprehensive set of scarce medical resources for 
such a few number of troops is too costly (Bayles, 1990).  Consequently, the DoD relies heavily 
upon the aeromedical evacuation system to bridge the gap in medical coverage.  While the 
aeromedical evacuation system staffs, trains and equips personnel to move stabilized patients 
under well-defined and planned circumstances, the lack of medical capability in Africa places 
unwarranted pressure on the aeromedical evacuation system to move unstable patients that are 
deteriorating due to lack of resources or expertise (Department, 2003).  
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The Air Force currently supports Africa with aircraft and aeromedical evacuation teams 
based in Ramstein, Germany where there is always a C-21 and an aeromedical evacuation crew 
sitting on Bravo Alert (three-hour launch window).  However, Africa is a very large continent, 
requiring long flight times to reach even the closest areas.  Figure 6 displays the size of Africa 
relative to other countries. 
 
Figure 6. Relative size of Africa 
Table 4 shows the flight times from Ramstein to Djibouti based on aeromedical 
evacuation mission data from 2010-2014.  Out of these three platforms, only the C-17 can make 
this trip without stopping while the C-130 and C-21 typically require two stops en route.  Not 
only do stops lengthen flight times, but they also require planners to consider contingency plans 
for each stop, in case the plane cannot take-off again and there is a patient onboard. 
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Table 4. Flight times, Ramstein to Djibouti 
 
Adding to this flight time is the initial alert response time.  Since the only aircraft 
currently dedicated to aeromedical evacuation is the C-21, tasking a C-130 or C-17 can 
significantly lengthen the response time from the times listed in Table 4.  For a C-130, the 
Patient Movement Requirements Center must send a request to the Aeromedical Evacuation 
Control Team in the 603rd Air Operations Center (AOC).  The Aeromedical Evacuation Control 
Team then works with the C-130 planners to see what is available.  Typically, an Urgent or 
Priority request takes precedent over other mission concerns and the aeromedical evacuation can 
“steal” a mission through the In-System Select (ISS) process.  However, taking an active mission 
does not speed the response time because the aircraft must first fly to Ramstein; unload its 
current cargo and pick-up an aeromedical evacuation crew.  Once the aeromedical evacuation 
crew responds, they must re-configure the aircraft to support an aeromedical evacuation mission 
before take-off.  For a C-17, the issue becomes more critical because there are no C-17s 
belonging to Ramstein.  Therefore, the Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team must request a C-
17 from the Tanker Airlift Control Center (TACC) in Scott AFB, IL.  If there is a C-17 available, 
it must go through the same process as a C-130. 
According to Duchateau et al (2009), “Setting up an aeromedical evacuation has some 
unavoidable time intervals: team recruitment, checking aircraft availability, travel to the airport, 
travel time to the incident site, and the evacuation itself” (p. 394).  Without any incident, the 
Time (hrs) Flight + Alert Time (hrs) Round Trip w/1 hr ground time
C-17 7:06 10:51 18:57:00
C-21 10:27 13:27 24:54:00
C-130 11:47 15:02 27:49:00
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quickest response time to a Patient Movement Request out of Djibouti is 10:51 hours.  However, 
as seen in Table 4, only the C-17 can make the round trip flight within the duty day restrictions.  
The other aircraft must RON, adding an additional 17 hours to the mission time. 
Adding to the delay, Africa consists of numerous small countries, each with various rules 
on how the DoD can operate.  Some countries do not allow the US to flyover, causing increased 
delays; other countries require a Raven crew to provide ground security.  If Ravens are required, 
there is another level of tasking and waiting.  Additionally, the Diplomatic Clearances (DIPS) 
(country specific permission to land) are not always up to date, and depending on the runway, the 
TERPS (runway landing survey that provides the landing and take-off instructions) may not be 
current for the specified runway.  In addition, refueling is a problem for most of the African 
countries.  Not only is the quality of the fuel questionable, but the payment method lends itself to 
corruption.  In many cases, airfields require cash payments and the prices vary, even at the same 
location, depending on who is managing operations at the time (Goldstein, 1999).  
As seen, “Planning of aeromedical evacuation cases often represents a logistical 
challenge.  Difficulties involving gathering adequate patient medical information, decisions on 
transport, route planning, different time zones, languages, and the variety of different health 
organizations in the country of transport origin should not be underestimated” (Sand, et al., 2010 
p. 408).  Each new level of complication creates another problem, while an injured troop is 
waiting in a possibly substandard medical facility. 
Given the limited availability of medical care in Africa, the decision of where to move 
the patient is very limited.  The number one choice is the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center 
(LRMC) in Ramstein, Germany.  This facility is a top tier trauma center that offers definitive 
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surgical care in a US owned, western environment.  However, given the time/distance factor, the 
Landstuhl Regional Medical Center is not always a feasible choice.  In some cases, heart attacks 
for instance, it is better to move the patient to Johannesburg, South Africa or even Dubai, given 
the criticality of the illness and location of the patient.  The importance of good relations with 
these countries is essential to bridge the gap in US medical coverage in Africa.  The 1995 version 
of JP 4-02, in reference to Special Operation Forces, describes a situation similar to the current 
situation in Africa, “AE [Aeromedical Evacuation] for SOF is difficult because SOF frequently 
operate at distant locations without any other assets in theater.  Remote locations in immature 
theaters not served by the strategic evacuation system requires close coordination between the 
supporting Air Force Component Command and Joint medical planners to identify the details 
and procedures for aeromedical evacuation” (pp. III-3).  In the same manner, aeromedical 
evacuation in Africa requires special consideration and detailed planning from all parties 
involved.  
International SOS 
Due to the limitations of the military’s current patient movement system, the DoD relies 
on International SOS for aeromedical evacuation support in Africa.  According to their website, 
“ISOS provides integrated medical, clinical, security, and customer care solutions to 
organizations with international operations,” and they act as the TRICARE medical insurer for 
all Active Duty Military overseas (International SOS, 2015a).  In addition to providing 
insurance, International SOS operates several 24/7 call centers, very similar to the Patient 
Movement Requirements Centers.  In fact, the International SOS call centers and the Patient 
Movement Requirements Centers work closely on a daily basis to track and manage all patient 
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movements within their respective theaters.  The London International SOS call center is the one 
responsible for oversight of Africa.  This call center has access to International SOS’ extensive 
medical facility database that describes the capabilities of most hospitals in the theater.  
International SOS sends teams to survey these hospitals and grade them against a Western 
standard of medicine.  Based on this information, International SOS can recommend local 
medical facilities; what treatments are advisable at these locations, how long the facilities are 
capable of holding a patient, along with other medical and administrative recommendations.  In 
addition, International SOS has access to translator services and can communicate with the local 
medical staff to determine the seriousness of the patient’s situation.  Furthermore, International 
SOS is the insurer and can guarantee payment for services, to ensure the service member 
receives the necessary care. 
After receiving notice of an injured service member, the Patient Movement Requirements 
Center contacts the medic on the ground, International SOS, and the Aeromedical Evacuation 
Control Team.  This four-way communication allows a synchronized effort between all parties.  
The Validating Flight Surgeon then makes the decision of patient movement destination and 
precedence level.  If it is decided to move the patient via aeromedical evacuation, the 
Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team looks for an aircraft to meet the necessary precedence 
(i.e. Urgent=ASAP, Priority =24 hours, Routine=72 hours).  Simultaneously, International SOS 
looks to its civilian air ambulance sector to see if they can better meet the patient movement 
requirements.  International SOS has one Learjet 35A in Nurnberg, Germany; one Learjet 45 in 
Lagos, Nigeria; one Learjet 35A in Abu Dhabi, UAE; and one Falcon 10 and two Learjet 35As 
in Johannesburg, South Africa (International SOS, 2011).  This infrastructure allows 
International SOS to reach into Africa from all four corners of the continent, typically quicker 
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than the DoD.  In addition, their aircraft are smaller and faster than most Air Force aeromedical 
evacuation platforms, and since they are not US flagged military planes, they typically have 
more over-flight and landing freedom than the military.  Furthermore, International SOS civilian 
air ambulances are not restricted to the AF TERPS, but can use commonly published take-off 
and landing procedures for any airport.  These factors make International SOS an extremely 
flexible and valuable partner in African aeromedical evacuation.   
However, International SOS is not without limitations.  International SOS supports a 
number of corporations and private individuals with this same capability, and the DoD must 
compete for International SOS’ limited resources (International SOS, 2015a).  Therefore, 
availability can be an issue.  In addition, International SOS is a civilian company.  As such, they 
will not operate in hostile environments.  If there is a security risk for their aircraft or personnel, 
International SOS is not obligated to provide patient movement support.  Therefore, International 
SOS is not a reliable planning factor for contingency response situations.    
Limited Resources Trade-off 
At the current level of operations in Africa, there is not enough incentive to build new 
medical treatment facilities on the continent.  Instead, the DoD continues to use aeromedical 
evacuation supplemented with other deployable medical resources such as Forward Surgical 
Teams (FSTs).  However, these resources are limited in their availability and the extent of their 
usefulness (Department, 2013b).  While each Forward Surgical Team offers surgical capability, 
they are an expensive, limited resource that the DoD allocates to their best use.  Additionally, a 
typical Forward Surgical Team requires logistical support, such as a Role 2 medical facility.  
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Therefore, what starts as a small Forward Surgical Team can quickly grow to a large operation 
(Department, 2013b).   
In reality, limited resources force the DoD to make trade-offs between additional risk and 
additional cost.  At equilibrium, the DoD has an unstated level of risk, which they place on the 
individual soldier, rather than spend money on additional medical resources.  The DoD cannot 
afford to provide a personal physician for every soldier, so the question becomes, what is the 
equilibrium level of risk and cost?  As the intensity of operations increase in Africa, the DoD 
will eventually cross the risk threshold, incentivizing additional medical expenditures.  However, 
this level is not expected in the near future.  In the meantime, the DoD requires a new way of 
thinking about the design and implementation of patient movement in order to bridge the medical 
gap with the currently supplied resources. 
Golden-hour 
The Golden-hour is the terminology given to a theory first hypothesized by Dr. R. Adams 
Cowley.  In his time spent in the University of Maryland Trauma Center, Cowley noted a 
significant increase in mortality and morbidity rates if trauma patients did not reach surgical care 
within an hour.  Boersma (1996) states, “There is conclusive evidence from clinical trials that 
reduction of mortality…is related to the time elapsing between onset of symptoms and 
commencement of treatment” (p. 771).  Some studies even suggest that mortality triples with 
every passing 30 minutes (Cowley, et al., 1973).  Other research presents evidence of the 
importance of elapsed time between injury and treatment as a critical factor in mortality and 
morbidity.  According to Blow, et al.’s (1999) article, early intervention improves survival after 
trauma.  Blow, et al. (1999) go on to state that “early rapid hemodynamic stabilization” and 
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“early correction of organ perfusion” are critical to prevent death in trauma patients (p. 964).  
Furthermore, Blow et al. (1999) finds that “early identification and aggressive resuscitation... 
improves survival and reduces complications in severely injured trauma patients” (p. 964).  
While the one-hour mark is highly debated, it is widely accepted that elapsed time to definitive 
surgery influences mortality and morbidity rates.  Nonetheless, there is a period of elapsed time, 
where depending upon the type and severity of the injury, the patient needs to have surgical 
intervention in order to prevent death (Stroud, 2008).  Given everything else is constant; it is true 
that providing quicker transportation is better (American, 2005).   
Epidemiology of Aeromedical Evacuation 
Very few epidemiologic studies exist in regards to aeromedical evacuation transport 
(Sand, et al., 2010).  There are a range of issues that mandate aeromedical evacuation, however, 
the lack of proper equipment, facilities, sanitation and expertise are usually involved (2010).  
According to Sand, et al. (2010), “Epidemiological assessment of aeromedical evacuation cases 
are needed to support efforts to optimize the logistic, medical, and economic aspects of this 
specialized form of monitored air transport” (p. 405).    
According to two studies, trauma, stroke, and myocardial infarction (MI) are the most 
common diagnosis for aeromedical evacuation patients who require a litter (Table 5) (Chawla, et 
al., 2001), (Sand, et al., 2010).  Sand, et al.’s (2010) study consists of 504 aeromedical 
evacuation cases performed by a German aeromedical evacuation company.  As a result, the 
cases originated primarily in Europe, Africa, and the Middle East (Table 6).  Approximately 95% 
of the patients were over the age of 18 with a range from one month to 96 years and a median of 
66 years.  Of the patients, 54% were male and 46% were female.  
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Table 5. Most frequent diagnoses of aeromedical 
 
 
Table 6. Geographic data: regions of transport origin 
 
 
Figure 7 shows Sand, et al.’s (2010) results with trauma and internal medicine being the 
top medical specialties required.  According to Blow, et al. (1999), trauma is the leading cause of 
death for people under 40 and trauma victims suffer from organ failure, respiratory 
complications, and increased ICU stays.  Given the poor state of African healthcare, a rapid 
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response to trauma is important.  Figure 8 shows the distribution of medical specialties by age.  
Here, the older populations dominate certain medical specialties like internal medicine and 
neurology while psychiatry and gynecology are typically for the younger populations. 
 
 
Figure 7. Number of different types of cases classified according to the specialty in charge of the patient prior to 
transportation 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Age distribution relative to specialty (old age: >70 y, middle age: 41–70 y, young age: 18–40 y, and pediatric: 1–18 y) 
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Costing 
According to Richmond (1992), “cost analysis is art, not science,” and requires many 
assumptions.  However, due to its high cost and predicted future growth as a means of providing 
medical care, “The economic aspects of aeromedical evacuation need to be critically evaluated” 
(Sand, et al., 2010 p. 408).  One of the first steps to optimize these resources is to determine “the 
cost-effectiveness and selection of the appropriate form of air transportation, while assuring the 
right medical response” (2010 p. 405).  “Cost effectiveness,” includes the calculation of the cost 
to perform an aeromedical evacuation mission. 
The absolute cost of flying one additional patient includes numerous resources by support 
activities such as personnel, finance, and CE (Kaplan, et al., 1998).  However, in the short term, 
the decision to produce one additional flight does not affect these resources because they are 
already “committed”.  Kaplan and Cooper (1998) illustrate this concept in the equation: 
 
resources supplied = consumed + excess capacity 
 
When the DoD determines to “consume” an additional aeromedical evacuation mission, 
they do not need to increase the resources supplied by a full “mission’s worth” as long as they 
have excess capacity that is already committed to the mission (Kaplan, et al., 1998).  For 
instance, the pilots, aeromedical evacuation crews, aircraft, runways, and control towers are 
committed resources and will not change with an additional mission.  Therefore, the only 
additional costs incurred are the truly variable costs such as fuel, maintenance, and supplies.  In 
the same manner, flying one less mission does not save a full “mission’s worth” of resources 
supplied, but merely shifts those resources from consumed back into excess capacity.  
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Aeromedical evacuation missions, like all services, cannot be inventoried and have no residual 
value (Rathmell, 1966).  Therefore, any excess capacity is simply lost, along with the committed 
resources supplied.  Since this study assumes the resources supplied for aeromedical evacuation 
missions are fixed in-spite of the aircraft type chosen and will not change even if 100% of flights 
were contracted to civilian agencies, it focuses on the truly avoidable costs rather than the 
absolute cost of flying an aeromedical evacuation mission (Malik, et al., 1995).  According to 
Martin (1993), when the government wants to determine the potential savings due to contracting 
out a service, they should focus on avoidable costs.  Using avoidable costs is the generally 
accepted method in a make-buy decision.  Martin states the following three principles to 
determine which costs are avoidable (1993): 
1. The ability of the public sector to reallocate resources efficiently. 
2. The extent of the privatization effort. 
3. The time period in which resource allocation is expected to occur. 
 
In accordance with these principles, this study assumes that: 
1. The DoD will not reallocate committed resources as a result of contracting 
aeromedical evacuation missions. 
2. The DoD will not completely privatize aeromedical evacuation and will always 
maintain organic aeromedical evacuation capability. 
3. This study focuses on short-run decisions and cannot affect committed 
resources. 
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Decision Tree Making 
The current process for determining which aircraft to use is simple.  The planners at the 
Patient Movement Requirements Center look at the time requirement to move the patient, and 
then they give MilAir the right of first refusal.  If the Air Operations Center cannot support the 
mission within the given timeframe, International SOS takes the mission.  This simple decision 
tree does not optimize the use of assets for training, cost, risk, or opportunity cost.  Rather, this 
tree is concerned with asset utilization rates.  The DoD’s use of fully allocated overhead costs 
creates many wrong incentives and resulting actions.  On one hand, the cost structure 
incentivizes the overuse of assets in an effort to decrease the cost per mission.  On the other 
hand, like in a make-buy decision, the inflated costs make the DoD uncompetitive with the 
market.  Neither approach is optimal.  A proper decision tree balances these incentives in an 
effort to maximize the effectiveness of the entire system and allocate scarce resources in a 
manner that ensures each service member receives the required care at the lowest possible cost to 
the system.  
According to Safavian and Landgrebe (1991), decision trees have three benefits:  
1. They allow the derivation of complex decisions through the combination of 
simple decisions. 
2. Not all decision points of the tree need testing in order to arrive at an optimal 
decision. 
3. Trees have a high degree of flexibility that improves performance. 
 
However, Safavian and Landgrebe (1991) identify the following as possible drawbacks to 
decision trees:  
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1. Overlap: failure to eliminate an option at a decision point, resulting in the 
option appearing in multiple choices at the next layer, increases the complexity 
of trees. 
2. Errors accumulate from layer to layer. 
3. The performance of the tree depends on the design.  Therefore, the design 
phase requires special attention. 
 
Safavian and Landgrebe (1991) offer several guidelines for developing a decision tree. 
1. Make obvious decisions first. 
2. Keep the tree as small as possible. 
3. Ensure decisions remain sequential. 
4. Test the tree for its robustness and understand its limits. 
 
In general, there are two types of tree designs.  The first is a “perfect tree,” built in a 
manner that correctly classifies every sample point used to construct the tree.  The second is an 
“imperfect tree” and is the preferred method.  The imperfect tree does not correctly classify 
every sample point, but rather provides the smallest possible error rate when testing its 
robustness against reality (Safavian, et al., 1991).  
Summary 
 Africa is a very poor continent with high levels of disease, few medical personnel, and 
some of the worst healthcare systems in the world.  In spite of this fact, the DoD continues to 
grow its presence on the continent without providing adequate additional medical treatment 
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facilities.  Instead, the DoD relies on the aeromedical evacuation system to bridge this medical 
gap in ways it is not designed, manned, trained or equipped to perform.  Further complicating 
this situation, the enormity of the continent makes it impossible for the DoD to meet its own 
patient movement standards in the Priority and Urgent categories over much of the continent.  
This lack of response places a level of risk on the military akin to that only experienced 
historically by Special Forces.  To rectify this situation, the DoD relies on contracted 
aeromedical evacuation support as a replacement for organic capability.  In an effort to better 
allocate the available resources to their highest benefit, this study seeks to develop a decision tree 
that determines the appropriate aircraft choice for aeromedical evacuation transport that will 
yield the required standard of care at the lowest cost to the DoD.   
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III. Methodology 
Chapter Summary 
Four phases comprise this research.  First, I verify and analyze patient movement data to 
develop and present a clear picture of the epidemiology of aeromedical evacuation in Africa as 
related to the DoD.  Second, I perform an economic evaluation to determine the avoidable cost of 
each mission, representing the actual cost savings had the missions not flown.  Third, I analyze 
the epidemiological and cost data to determine which aircraft choice presents the lowest cost 
while still meeting the required level of patient care.  This analysis then allows the development 
of a decision tree tool that provides an easy and robust method to determine the optimal aircraft 
choice for aeromedical evacuation. 
Methodology for Epidemiology 
 I used Sand, et al.’s (2010), Epidemiology of Aeromedical Evacuation, as a general 
example of how to perform and present my study.  The TRAC2ES database contains all the raw 
data for this analysis.  I accessed TRAC2ES by request through the following email 
address: transcom.scott.tcj6.mbx.service-desk@mail.mil and received access to the Patient 
Movement and Ad-hoc Reporting tools.  At the end of each calendar year, TRAC2ES archives 
its dataset into a Microsoft Excel format containing information on the Patient Movement 
Requests for that year to include origin, destination, mission ID and aircraft type (of the last 
mission boarded by the patient), as well as precedent, patient classification, diagnosis, and other 
pertinent information.  These files reside in the Patient Movement module under the Tools tab 
and the Downloads sub tab.  Although 2007 marked the first year of AFRICOM, the current 
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patient movement system did not exist until International SOS won the Tricare Overseas 
Program contract in October 2009 (International SOS, 2015b).  Therefore, for this study I use the 
five Patient Movement Request data files that correspond with 2010 through 2014.   
After downloading the data files, the first step was to combine each file into a single 
Excel spreadsheet with 106,740 records.  I then filtered by the preexisting headings and sorted to 
show only the records with a “Current PMR State” of “Completed” and with an “Origin Theater” 
of “AFRICOM,” leaving 836 records.  This data represented all completed Patient Movement 
Requests that originated in the AFRICOM Theater to include those moving with commercial 
airline tickets, privately owned vehicles, or as MEDPAX.  MEDPAX is a type of patient 
movement where the patient is well enough to travel without medical supervision and travels on 
a military aircraft as a “space available” passenger.  Since I am only interested in aeromedical 
evacuation movements, I eliminated any record without a Mission ID as all aeromedical 
evacuation missions have an ID number assigned.  This filter left 344 records, but still contained 
MEDPAX patients because they also have a Mission ID assigned.  Next, I filtered out any record 
with a “Movement Classification Code” of 9V.  The 9V code is the designation for MEDPAX, 
beginning in 2014.  This filter resulted in 286 records.  In order to identify and filter any previous 
MEDPAX records; I looked at the Mission IDs.  In a standard mission ID, aeromedical 
evacuation missions have an L for the second character.  In addition, it is the Theater Patient 
Movement Requirements Center-Europe’s convention to begin the mission ID of any civilian air 
ambulance mission with “CAA.”  Moreover, only ambulatory outpatients (Movement 
Classification Code of 5A) can fly as MEDPAX.  Using this information, I identified 27 
questionable records.  Of those 27 records, three of the missions also had patients with a 
Movement Classification Code that requires aeromedical evacuation transport.  Filtering out 
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these codes left only 15 questionable records representing eight different missions.  I then looked 
up each of these records in the Patient Movement Request Archives section of TRAC2ES, where 
I used the Movement Remarks section to determine if the patient traveled on an aeromedical 
evacuation mission or as a MEDPAX.   
To ensure I correctly identified all the AFRICOM aeromedical evacuation missions, I 
requested access to GDSS through the Account Validation Manager and Functional 
Representative located at HQ AMC/A6.  Once granted, I accessed the GDSS website 
at https://gdssams.maf.ustranscom.mil and ran the standard report called Aeromedical 
Evacuation Billing, located under the report tab.  This report allowed me to see the mission 
information (including take-off times, landing times, origins, and destinations) for missions 
billed as aeromedical evacuations from 2010 to 2014.  I copied the data into Excel and sorted for 
missions with a destination or origin ICAO code (International Civil Aviation Organization) 
beginning with D, F, G, or H.  ICAO codes are internationally recognized airport identification 
codes.  The letters D, F, G, and H represent airports in Africa.  In this data, nine GDSS missions 
did not appear in the TRAC2ES data.  To reconcile this mismatch, I pulled a complete list of all 
Mission IDs and Cite Numbers from the Ad-Hoc Reporting function in TRAC2ES.  I then used 
the mission IDs, flight times, dates, origins, and destinations to identify the missing missions.  
Once identified, I looked up the corresponding information in TRAC2ES to determine if the 
mission should be included.  Of these nine missions, one originated from an island with an 
African ICAO but under the jurisdiction of PACOM.  One originated from the Sinai Peninsula, 
which falls under CENTCOM.  One mission had an aeromedical evacuation designation in 
GDSS when it was actually a MEDPAX mission.  One mission was in TRACE2ES with a 
typographical error where someone typed the mission as 220B041 rather than 210B041.  One 
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mission was in TRAC2ES under a different ID because a change in patient status required the 
use of a different aeromedical evacuation mission with a Critical Care Air Transport Team.  One 
mission incorrectly listed the origin theater as EUCOM within TRAC2ES.  One was due to the 
patient flying to CENTCOM prior to flying to EUCOM.  This additional leg resulted in the 
Patient Movement Request showing the origin theater as CENTCOM.  One was a case where a 
new aircraft replaced the original aircraft because it broke during a fuel stop.  Finally, one 
mission was not in TRAC2ES presumably due to its classification level. 
Next, I compared the TRAC2ES data to the GDSS data and found 20 mission IDs in 
TRAC2ES that were not in GDSS (not counting the civilian air ambulance missions because 
GDSS only tracks MilAir).  To reconcile this data, I performed a Mission Search in GDSS using 
the date-time group and ICAO codes indicated for each of the mission IDs.  If this did not help 
me locate the mission in GDSS, I searched for a partial mission ID match by using the first few 
letters of the ID.  This process allowed me to identify missions that crossed multiple days, but 
were the same flight.  The last three letters of a mission ID are the Julian date and the same 
mission can have multiple IDs if it crosses different days.  Eight of the twenty missions were C-
21 missions as indicated by a 2 in the first digit of the mission ID.  All EUCOM C-21 missions 
receive funds through USAFE Operations and Maintenance and not through the Transportation 
Working Capital Fund (TWCF).  Therefore, these missions do not show on the “AE Billing” 
report.  One mission was an experimental mission with a contracted G-III that was not in AE-
Billing.  Four missions lacked the appropriate “L” indicator and therefore did not appear in the 
AE Billing report.  One mission was a MEDPAX mission.  The remaining missions did not 
appear in the AE Billing report because TRAC2ES lists the “last boarded” mission.  In these 
cases, the patients traveled on other aeromedical evacuation flights, primarily back to the US, 
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causing new mission IDs to appear in TRAC2ES.  I identified these occurrences by mission IDs 
beginning with J, A, or P.  These letters indicate a C-17 mission, and most follow-on missions to 
the US are on C-17s.  Once identified, I updated the data with the mission ID of the original 
aeromedical evacuation rather than the flight home. 
Through process of elimination, record review, and cross-referencing between the two 
databases, I successfully reconciled 100% of the aeromedical evacuation missions listed in both 
GDSS and TRAC2ES.  Once I reconciled a missing mission, I found the corresponding record in 
GDSS and TRAC2ES and either added or deleted the record from my initial file.  The result was 
a total of 274 Patient Movement Requests and a corresponding 170 aeromedical evacuation 
missions originating from Africa between 2010 and 2014.   
Once I had the correct records identified, I aligned the TRAC2ES data with the GDSS 
data within the same file.  I then ensured that every category of data was correct by cross-
referencing other categories.  For instance, if the Personnel Service Code was A11 (Army Active 
Duty), then the “Service” block had to read “Army”, the “Age” had to be above 18, and they had 
to have a rank.  I clarified and corrected any mismatched or blank data by reading the remarks 
section of the Patient Movement Request.  I corrected several of the “Personnel Status Names” 
and “Service Grade Names” to show the nature of the move as “humanitarian”, “active duty”, or 
a “dependent/DoD employee.”  This data needed correction because TRAC2ES’ coding scheme 
changed between 2010 and 2014.  As a result, K-codes became X-codes and some of the 
verbiage in the naming conventions changed.  I also verified that all the mission times, dates, 
ICAOs, and aircraft matched in TRAC2ES and GDSS and that the times recorded were for the 
correct leg of the aeromedical evacuation mission.  Although many patients had follow-on 
aeromedical evacuation missions to the US or other location, I focused on the initial movements.   
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Next, in a separate tab, I identified the missions that had multiple patients onboard and 
assigned to those missions the total number of litter patients, ambulatory patients, and the highest 
precedence classification of any patient on that flight.  Since many of the Origin Facility names 
listed “Other AFRICOM”, I identified all the origin and destination countries for each mission 
by looking at the ICAOs in GDSS or by the itinerary section of the Patient Movement Request in 
TRAC2ES. 
Finally, I took the data and composed a series of charts, graphs, and maps to present a 
clear picture of the epidemiology of the DoD’s aeromedical evacuation in Africa.  
Methodology for Costing 
Once I had clean data, I began the process of assigning avoidable costs to each mission.  
The Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center-Europe provided the civilian air ambulance 
cost data.  This data originates from quotes presented by International SOS prior to performing 
each mission.  An operations officer at the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center-
Europe signs each quote and retains a copy for their records.  The Theater Patient Movement 
Requirements Center-Europe provided an Excel file that listed these costs for each civilian air 
ambulance move from 2011 to 2014, based on the country where the patients originated.  They 
also provided a homegrown Microsoft Access database called the Intratheater Movement 
Tracker.  This database had the dates, costs, and origins of civilian air ambulances for 2010-2012 
with some data for 2013.  Although these cost databases were not complete, together, they 
accounted for all but 13 of the 123 civilian air ambulance missions.  I estimated the missing costs 
based on the average cost of civilian air ambulance missions with the same country of origin 
except for the Zimbabwe mission CAA3AF01A084A.  This mission was the only one to 
41 
Zimbabwe, so I estimated its cost based on the average cost of $7K/flight hour and an average 
speed of 380mph as derived in the Methodology for Decision Tool section.  Although Martin 
(1993) suggests considering contract administration costs in addition to the quoted price when 
calculating avoidable costs, as long as International SOS maintains the Tricare Overseas 
contract, of which aeromedical evacuation is only a small portion, we assume the administration 
costs are committed and do not change.  As a result, the only avoidable cost is the quoted price. 
In order to determine the avoidable cost of each military flight, I determined the length of 
time for each mission using the GDSS data.  The calculation included the flight from the aircraft 
origin to the pick-up location and the flight from the pick-up to the final destination.  In 
determining avoidable cost, I assumed the aircraft choice does not affect the number of planes, 
personnel, infrastructure, and support activities provided by the DoD to perform aeromedical 
evacuations.  Therefore, the avoidable costs consisted of certain direct operating costs which, 
according to SH&E International Air Transport Consultancy, consist of four categories (Horder, 
2003):  
1. Flight Operations 
2. Maintenance 
3. Depreciation 
4. User Charges 
 For Flight Operations, I included general crew expenses, fuel and oil.  For Maintenance, I 
included labor (if contracted), repairs, and material.  This data came from the AFI 65-503, Table 
A4-1, Logistics Cost Factors Description (Air, 2015).  I used the cost data for each aircraft based 
on what year the mission was flown.  For Depreciation, I did not include a value since the market 
values of aircraft depreciate primarily with time, and therefore, utilization is only a concern if it 
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is significantly different from an average aircraft (Conklin & deDecker, 2016).  User Charges are 
the various fees charged by governments and airports for using their facilities or airspace 
(Horder, 2003).  These fees include charges for landing, passengers, security, infrastructure, 
parking, environment, terminal usage, fly-over, and taxes (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2009).  According to McLaren (2007), Sub-Sahara Africa is very expensive, citing 
a single flight from Europe to Nigeria costing over $10,000, with $4000 in handling, $3100 in 
navigation and $3036 in airport fees.  This is confirmed from the Djibouti International Airport 
website stating landing fees alone are $7/ton (based on maximum take-off weight) plus $380 
(Aéroport de Djibouti, 2015).  Based on the C-17’s 585,000-pound maximum take-off weight, 
this puts the cost of a landing at $2,427.  In addition, there are other charges such as $84 per 
passenger, $65 for lighting, $0.50 per hectoliter fuel surcharge, $0.17 per ton per hour parking, 
and up to $2,500 each for cargo and passenger handling (2015).  Although these costs are truly 
avoidable, I do not have the necessary information to determine what the DoD pays in user 
charges.  Therefore, to remain conservative in my cost calculations, I did not include any user 
charges. 
 Next, I determined the number of personnel aboard each aircraft in order to calculate the 
cost of per diem and special pays.  To determine the number of personnel, I used the base crews 
for each aircraft as outlined in 11-2C-21v3 (2010), 11-2C-17v3 (2011), 11-2C-130v3 (2012a), 
and AFI11-2AEv3 (2014).  I then determined if the crew required augmentation based on the 
calculated total mission time.  If the total mission time was more than the basic flight day, I 
considered it an augmented crew unless there was enough ground time for crew rest, in which 
case, I considered it a basic crew.  Additionally, I added the appropriate medical crewmembers if 
the mission required a Critical Care Air Transport Team.   
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Depending on the origin of the patient, each member of the crew is eligible to receive 
certain special pays and allowances.  To determine this expense, I identified eight different 
countries within my dataset from which the DoD flew an aeromedical evacuation mission with 
MilAir.  I then cross-referenced my list with the special pay locations identified in DoD 7000.14-
R.  Of these locations, Djibouti is the only country designated for Combat Zone Tax Exclusion 
(CZTE).  However, Egypt, Kenya, Liberia, Djibouti, and Libya qualified for Imminent Danger 
Pay of $7.5/day.  To calculate the cost of Combat Zone Tax Exclusion, I assumed an average 
rank of Captain for officers and Staff Sergeant for enlisted.  I then used the AFI 65-503, Table 
A19-2, Active Air Force Standard Composite Rates by Grade Description to determine the 
average base pay for each rank (SAF/FM, 2015).  From there, I calculated the cost based on the 
15% federal tax bracket.  Combat Zone Tax Exclusion exempts each member from paying taxes 
on income for the month they were present in the zone.   
In addition to special pay, the DoD compensates crewmembers for lodging, meals, and 
incidental expenses, collectively referred to as per diem.  Using the Per Diem Rates Query Tool 
on defensetravel.dod.mil, I identified the per diem allowance for each location based on 2015 
rates.  If the crew did not RON, then I subtracted the lodging expense from the per diem rate.  
Once calculated, I summed the costs to determine the total avoidable costs for MilAir 
aeromedical evacuation missions. 
On four of the C-130 missions to Djibouti, the initial legs of the flights did not match the 
scenario because the aeromedical crew flew to Djibouti on separate missions.  Without this data, 
I could not calculate the appropriate flight hours.  To compensate, I assigned a cost equivalent to 
the lowest costing C-130 mission to Djibouti.  For the single G-III mission, I used the cost factor 
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of a C-20.  For the one mission that switched from a C-130 to a C-21, I used the cost data of the 
C-130 since it flew the majority of the mission.  
Methodology for Decision Tools 
 Decision tools provide a quick and easy method to analyze multiple factors with limited 
expertise.  In this research, I develop a decision tree tool and a map tool.  These tools identify the 
aircraft that minimizes the cost of aeromedical evacuation missions while meeting the criteria 
specified by the Validating Flight Surgeon and DoD regulations.  Within these tools, I included 
duty day, crew rest requirements, aircraft speed, aircraft size, aircraft origin, and cost per flying 
hour as constraints.  Other factors not considered were the amount of tasking time needed to task 
an aircraft, if the mission requires a Raven crew, restrictions on over flight of US flagged 
military aircraft, if TERPS are up to date, and diplomatic clearances.  These factors are a 
secondary consideration since they are outside the scope of these tools. 
The decision tree tool walks the user through the necessary steps to identify the most 
economical aircraft choice.  The inputs considered in the development of this decision tree were 
contingent environment, precedence category, distance from Ramstein Air base, number of 
patients injured, necessary training requirements for the 86th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, 
avoidable cost, and “no-stop” requirements.  In developing this tool, the number one priority was 
to meet the patient care standards as designated by Urgent, Priority, or Routine.  The financial 
implications were second to patient care; however, once I met the patient requirements, the 
avoidable cost became the dominant discriminator.  I designed the decision tool to eliminate 
possibilities as quickly as possible in order to minimize the length of the tree.  Broad categories 
such as contingent/not contingent are early in the tree, in order to eliminate the most possibilities.  
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I designed the tool to work best for the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center-Europe 
and the 603 Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team, however, military planners from all 
branches can use this tool to see the medical coverage available for forward deployed forces in 
Africa.  A completed AF Form 3899, Patient Movement Record, provides the minimum 
information required to complete the tool.  The tool asks about training requirements for the 
Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron, however, this is primarily for the Aeromedical Evacuation 
Control Team and the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center-Europe since they work 
closely with the Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron on a daily basis.  The Aeromedical 
Evacuation Squadron is limited to four hours of training on an operational mission.  Therefore, I 
calculated any savings incurred by training during an operational mission at the C-130 rate of 
$5K per flight hour, resulting in a $20K savings per training mission (Department, 2013a).  
Additionally, I added a Decision Tree for Routine patient movements to help users identify the 
optimal aircraft for Routine aeromedical evacuations.  This decision tree identifies the optimal 
aircraft choice for a “normal” movement.  However, other factors affect aircraft choice such as 
aircraft availability, weather, political boundaries, and severity of patient condition.  Therefore, 
this tool is only a guide and does not usurp the recommendation from experienced operators.   
I began developing the map tool with Google’s My Map.  Using My Map, I created 10 
map layers in which I plotted aircraft locations, ranges, areas of responsibilities, costs, and 
patient movement data.  The first step was to plot the location of the aircraft and the 
corresponding AORs for the civilian air ambulances.  I assumed that the civilian air ambulance 
closest to the patient’s origin is the primary responder, unless that patient is returning to South 
Africa, in which case the civilian air ambulance from Johannesburg is the primary responder.  I 
developed four layers, each representing the AOR of the four civilian air ambulance locations 
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(FALA: South Africa, DNMM: Nigeria, EDDN: Nurnberg, OMAA: Abu Dhabi).  For MilAir, 
their AOR is all of Africa.  The second step was to plot the ranges for each aircraft on a cost 
basis.  This step required the calculation of the cost per flight hour for each MilAir aircraft, as 
well as each of the four civilian air ambulance locations.  Using my mission data in Excel, I 
assigned each civilian air ambulance mission to a specific civilian air ambulance AOR based on 
my assumption that the closest civilian air ambulance would provide response, except for those 
with a destination of South Africa.  This assignment allowed me to calculate the total miles 
flown on each mission.  I then calculated the average speed of the aircraft according to the 
corresponding AOR.  I filtered the data by AOR and calculated the actual speed based on the 
number of miles flown and the corresponding take-off and landing times.  All distances came 
from the Great Circle Mapper at www.gcmap.com.  I then averaged these speeds according to 
their AOR, resulting in a speed of 398 mph for Abu Dhabi, 380 mph for Nurnberg, 441 MPH for 
Nigeria, and 380 mph for South Africa.  I also calculated the average speed of the MilAir planes 
based on their actual number of miles flown and the corresponding take-off and landing times.  
The result was 411mph for the C-17, 276 mph for the C-130, and 298 mph for the C-21.  These 
numbers agree with the block-speeds listed in AFPAM 10-1403. 
With the civilian air ambulance speeds calculated, I then calculated the number of flight 
hours from initial take-off to the patient location and then from the patient location to the final 
destination.  This data already existed for the MilAir missions.  Using these hours and the 
previously calculated avoidable costs, I calculated an avoidable cost per flight hour for each 
mission.  I then took the average cost per flight hour for each MilAir aircraft type and civilian air 
ambulance AOR.  The result was $13.4K/hour for Abu Dhabi, $4k/hour for Nurnberg, 
$15.3K/hour for Nigeria, $7K/hour for South Africa, $14K/hour for the C-17, $5K/hour for the 
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C-130, and $1.8K/hour for the C-21.  With the average avoidable cost per flight-hour and the 
average aircraft speed, I then calculated the range that each civilian air ambulance location could 
support for different price intervals and plotted these ranges on the map. 
For MilAir, I calculated the maximum ranges of each aircraft based on the average speed, 
the augmented duty day and the standard alert times shown in Table 1, and the average ground-
time.  The duty day does not begin until one hour after alert; however, the regulated time to 
respond to a patient begins once the Validating Flight Surgeon approves the Patient Movement 
Request.  I calculated an average ground-time of 2.37 hours by averaging the ground-times of 
missions that did not go into crew-rest.  I then valued each range at the average avoidable cost 
per flight hour calculation.  For the C-21 and the C-130, the range is the same for an Urgent or 
Priority mission since the duty day is the limiting factor.  Since the C-17 has a duty day of 24 
hours, the limiting factor is the regulated response times.  As such, the C-17 has a separate range 
for Urgent and Priority moves.  I did not factor tasking time into the range calculations.  
However, the Urgent ranges for the C-130 and C-17 have no buffer for tasking time.  Therefore, 
any additional time used to task these aircraft for an Urgent mission reduces their ranges by the 
same amount of time.  I included a note in the map layers to remind the user of these tasking 
limitations. 
Civilian air ambulances have a more lax enforcement of duty day limitations as compared 
with MilAir.  Therefore, their primary limiting factor was the size of their AOR.  I calculated the 
maximum possible flight distances for each civilian air ambulance’s AOR.  Given these 
distances, the aircraft speeds, and a 2.37-hour ground-time, I determined that the civilian air 
ambulances could move patients from any location within the prescribed Urgent/Priority 
timeframes and deliver the patients to their final destinations within an 18-hour duty day.  It is 
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reasonable to assume that these civilian air ambulances fly 18-hour duty days since the FAA 
rules allow 14 hours and any additional time needed to reach the closest acceptable destination in 
order to accomplish emergency and government-sponsored operations (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2011).  I did not consider alert time in range calculations for civilian air 
ambulances since the civilian duty day begin when the pilot reports for duty (2011).  In addition, 
since International SOS has dedicated aeromedical evacuation aircraft, I considered the pre-flight 
preparation time inconsequential.  
In the final two layers, I plotted all the Urgent and Priority patient movements that 
occurred over my study period.  These layers allow the user to see actual data points, reinforcing 
the accuracy of the tool. 
Methodology for Comparing Decision Tree with Actual Cost 
I ran the 170 missions through my decision tree tool in order to analyze the differences 
between my proposed model for choosing an aircraft type and the actual choice made.  I used the 
following assumptions in the execution of my tool: all aircraft types are available, there are zero 
“no-stop” requirements, there are zero training requirements, no space-A, and MilAir missions 
originate from Ramstein. 
Next, I analyzed the financial impact of using the decision tree versus the real-world 
decision.  Specifically, I evaluated the differences in avoidable costs of each mission in which 
the decision tree recommended a different aircraft than that actually chosen.  For this analysis, I 
first determined the number of flight hours required to get the patient to the final destination with 
the newly designated aircraft.  For MilAir, I used Ramstein as the aircraft origin and final 
destination.  Great Circle Mapper provided the round-trip distances.  Using the speeds calculated 
earlier, I determined the number of flight hours and priced them using the logistics cost factor 
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per diem, Immanent Danger Pay, and Combat Zone Tax Exclusion just as I did during my initial 
cost determinations.  For civilian air ambulances, I used the aircraft origin closest to the patient 
location.  I assumed the final destination for patients in the South Africa AOR was South Africa.  
I used Ramstein as the final destination for all other patients.  Great Circle Mapper provided the 
distances of the following legs: aircraft origin: patient origin and patient origin: patient 
destination.  Using the speeds as calculated earlier, I determined the total flight hours for each 
mission.  I then calculated the average cost per flight hour by year for each AOR using the 
original data set.  With this cost information, I priced each mission according to the AOR and 
year flown.  I then compared these costs to the actual costs incurred as calculated in the 
Methodology for Costing section. 
Summary 
 This chapter discussed the research methodologies used to develop the epidemiology of 
aeromedical evacuation, calculate the avoidable costs, develop decision tools that identify the 
most economical aircraft choice, and compare the decision tool outcome with real-world 
decisions.  The following chapter presents the analysis and results of this research.    
50 
IV. Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter begins with the results of the epidemiological analysis of the 274 patients 
moved on the 170 aeromedical evacuation missions in Africa from 2010-2014.  For ease of 
understanding, I present the information in graphical form and provide a brief interpretation and 
analysis of each graph.  Following the epidemiology, I present the overall cost of aeromedical 
evacuation in Africa.  Next, I present the decision map tool to show the gaps in aeromedical 
evacuation coverage.  I conclude with an analysis of the results found using the decision tree 
tool, including the cost savings available through proper aircraft choice. 
Epidemiology 
 
Figure 9. Patient Movement Requests by Patient Grade 
Figure 9 shows the number of Patient Movement Requests by pay grade.  As expected, I 
see the military’s heavy dependence on E4s through E6s and O3s through O5s.  The category, 
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K91, represents “Civilian-Disaster/Humanitarian/Refugee.”  The DoD moved these 26 patients 
on the same day from Libya.  The code N00 represents dependents and civilian federal 
employees.  Civilian employees represent a challenge because, while they are entitled to 
aeromedical evacuation, they are not entitled to Tricare benefits.  As a result, they are restricted 
to the limited capability of MilAir, without the benefit of civilian air ambulances. 
 
Figure 10. Patient Movement Requests by Patient Age 
Figure 10 represents the number of aeromedical evacuations by age.  This graph shows 
that the DoD moves very few children in Africa, primarily due to the lack of dependent families 
stationed on the continent.  Instead, there is a peak at the age of 22 with a steady decline 
afterwards.  Of these 22 year old patients, all were enlisted E2s through E5s except for a single 
civilian humanitarian move. 
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Figure 11. Patient Movement Requests by Patient Gender 
 Figure 11 shows the breakdown of male and female aeromedical evacuations.  Over the 
last five years, approximately 14.2 percent of aeromedical evacuations were for females.  This 
number coincides with the overall number of females serving on active duty (CNN, 2013). 
 
Figure 12. Patient Movement Requests by Service 
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 Figure 12 displays the number of aeromedical evacuations by patients’ branch of service.  
The “Not AD Service” category represents all Guard, Reserve, civilians, and dependents.  Over 
16% of movements fall into this category.  As expected, the Navy has the highest occurrence of 
patient moves in Africa since they maintain the only permanent base on the continent. 
 
Figure 13. Patient Movement Requests by Month (five-year Total) 
 Figure 13 attempts to identify any cyclical nature of aeromedical evacuations in Africa.  
There is a clear peak in Patient Movement Requests in April and another in October; however, 
the outlier of 26 humanitarian moves skews the October peak as seen in Figure 17.  Excluding 
these moves, the second peak occurs in September, with January and August representing the 
months with the fewest moves.  Mission frequency, as shown in Figure 14, may provide a better 
understanding of aeromedical evacuation demand.  This graph has the same peak in April, but 
the October peak subsides.  On the average, the DoD flies 3 missions and 4.5 patients from 
Africa each month.  
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Figure 14. Missions by Month (five-year Total) 
 
Figure 15. Patient Movement Requests by Year (five-year Total) 
 Figure 15 shows the trend of patient movements over time.  There is a clear jump in 
2011, partly due to the civilian movements that occurred during the Libyan conflicts.  There is a 
growing trend in patient movements from 2012 through 2014.  This increase is partly due to an 
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increasing number of Routine patients moved via aeromedical evacuation as seen in Figure 22.  
In addition, aeromedical evacuations resulting from deployments during the Liberian Ebola 
outbreak contributed to seven additional patient movement requests. 
 
Figure 16. Missions by Year (five-Year Total) 
The number of missions per year as seen in Figure 16 closely mimics the number of 
patients moved each year.  The DoD moves an average of 55 patients on 34 aeromedical 
evacuation missions each year. 
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Figure 17. Patient Movement Requests Over Time 
Figure 17 displays the number of aeromedical evacuations over time.  As seen, the past 
five years do not show a clear seasonal pattern.  However, there is a clear increase between 
March and July of 2014.  Of the 51 patients moved in these months, 38 were Routine patients on 
nine MilAir missions departing from Djibouti.  In comparison, only 11 Routine patients on five 
missions moved from Djibouti from 2010 through 2013.  The cause of this increase is unknown, 
but may be due to planners choosing to group “well-patients” and fly them on Routine 
aeromedical evacuation missions rather than fly them on commercial airlines.   
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Figure 18. Missions Over Time 
 Just as the number of Patient Movement Requests vary each month, so do the number of 
missions.  Figure 18 shows the number of missions each month, ranging from zero to seven.  
 
Figure 19. Patient Movement Requests by Patient Status Code 
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 Figure 19 shows the number of aeromedical evacuations by patient status code.  The Ns, 
As, Ms, Fs are Navy, Army, Marine, and Air Force.  The 11s are active duty, 12s are Reservist, 
15s are Guard, and 41s are dependents.  The Ks represent other civilian categories, while C and P 
are Coast Guard and Public Health Service.  Of the total patients moved, 56% are Active Duty 
Navy and Army. 
 
Figure 20. Patient Movement Requests by Patient Classification Code 
 Figure 20 shows patient moves by their classification.  Codes beginning 1-4 represent 
inpatients and 5 represents outpatients.  The most common classification is a mobile litter patient 
(2B) followed by an immobile litter patient (2A).  Together, these classes comprise 58% of all 
movements.  Psychiatric categories (1B, 1C, and 5C) represent 8% of movements as compared 
with 12% of global patient movements during the same period. 
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Figure 21. Patient Movement Requests by Patient Precedence Category 
 Figure 21 decomposes aeromedical evacuations by Precedence.  The split between 
Routine and Priority is roughly equal around 45%.  The 31 Urgent moves comprise 11% of all 
aeromedical evacuations.  I further analyzed these categories in the following graphs. 
 
Figure 22. Patient Movement Requests by Precedence Over Time 
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 Figure 22 shows the breakdown of precedence over time and shows the increase of 
Routine movements in 2014.  As described in the Methodology section, these missions do not 
include the MedPax patient categories.  The remaining precedence categories appear more stable 
over time.   
 
Figure 23. Missions by Precedence Over Time 
Figure 23 shows the number of missions flown by precedence category.  This graph 
indicates a rising trend in Routine and Urgent missions with little change to Priority missions.   
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Figure 24. Patient Movement Requests by Days from Patient Movement Request Creation to Patient Movement 
Figure 24 shows the number of days it took to move each patient by their precedence 
classification.  To generate this chart, I compared the TRAC2ES cite number with the actual 
pick-up date.  The cite number generates once a Patient Movement Request is submitted in 
TRAC2ES and consists of the five digit Julian Date (YYDDD), a three digit Patient Movement 
Requirements Center indicator (235 being the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center-
Europe), and a two digit number specifying the order in which that Patient Movement Request 
appeared that day.  Given the standards (12 hours for Urgent, 24 hours for Priority, and 72 hours 
for Routine), no movement should take longer than three days, and no Urgent or Priority patient 
should take more than one day.  However, 14% of all patients moved 72-hours or more after 
submitting the request.  Furthermore, over 23% of the Priority patients and almost 10% of 
Urgent patients moved 24-hours or more after submitting the request.  In the worst case, it took 
seven days to move a Priority patient and five days to move an Urgent patient.  In all, over 23% 
of movements in Africa missed the regulated timelines.  However, this data does not show the 
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time it took the Theater Patient Movement Requirements Center-Europe to validate the patient 
move as safe and necessary. 
 
Figure 25. Patient Movement Requests by Aircraft Type 
Figure 25 shows a similar number of patients split between civilian air ambulances and 
MilAir.  However, as seen in Figure 36, civilian air ambulances fly many more missions.  The 
difference is in the patient load.  MilAir missions have more than one patient 51% of the time as 
compared with only 18% of civilian air ambulances.  This difference is due to the small size of 
civilian air ambulances and to the fact that the 1998 version of DODi 6000.11restricted use of 
civilian air ambulances to Urgent and Priority patients.  Although the 2012 version deleted this 
restriction, it is still a common practice.  In the last five years, civilian air ambulances flew 17% 
of Routine missions compared with 83% of Urgent and Priority missions.  Since Routine 
missions are more likely to have multiple patients (Figure 35), the overall number of patients 
moved by the two segments is comparable.  
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Figure 26. Patient Movement Requests with Special Teams 
 Figure 26 shows 14% of all patients required some sort of special care team.  Both 
MilAir and civilian air ambulances have a Critical Care Air Transport Team capability.  Table 7 
shows the medical specialty and diagnosis of patients on missions requiring a special team. 
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Table 7. Diagnosis and Required Specialty for Aeromedical Evacuations with Special Teams 
 
Primary MEDSPEC Name Primary Diagnosis Name
Burns BURN NOS TRUNK-UNSPEC
Cardiology MI,INF,UNSPEC EPISODE
Cardiology TACHYCARDIA NOS
Cardiology OLD MYOCARDIAL INFARCT
Cardiology MI,SUBENDCARD,UNSPEC EPISODE
Cardiology SINOATRIAL NODE DYSFUNCT
Cardiology MI,SUBENDCARD,UNSPEC EPISODE
Cardiology MI,ANT,UNSPEC EPISODE
Cardiology MI,UNSPEC SITE,INIT EPISODE
Gastroenterology GASTROINTEST HEMORR NOS
General Surgery TRAUMATIC SHOCK
General Surgery OTHER INJURY OF CHEST WALL
Infectious Disease MALARIA NOS
Internal Medicine CHEST PAIN, UNSPECIFIED
Internal Medicine HEAT STROKE SUNSTROKE
Internal Medicine VENOUS THROMBOSIS NOS
Internal Medicine ANGINA PECTORIS NEC/NOS
Internal Medicine POISON-MEDICINAL AGT NOS
Neurology TB MENINGITIS-UNSPEC
Neurology CEREBRAL EDEMA
Neurosurgery ACUTE ILL-DEF CEREBROVASC
Neurosurgery TRAUMATIC SUBDURAL HEM
Neurosurgery INJ SUPERF NERV HEAD/NCK
Neurosurgery INJURY TO NERVE NOS
Neurosurgery SUBARACHNOID HEMORRHAGE
Neurosurgery CEREBROVASCULAR ANOMALY
Orthopedic Surgery FX FIBULA NOS-OPEN
Orthopedic Surgery FX FEMUR NOS-OPEN
Orthopedic Surgery FX RADIUS SHAFT-OPEN
Orthopedic Surgery AMPUT ABOVE KNEE, UNILAT
Otorhinolaryngology PERITONSILLAR ABSCESS
Peripheral Vascular Surgery INJ INTERNL JUGULAR VEIN
Peripheral Vascular Surgery INJ COMMON FEMORAL ARTER
Psychiatry (Male General Care) SUIC,POIS,ANALG/ANTIPY/ANTIRHE
Pulmonary Disease OTHER PULMON EMBOL & INFARCT
Pulmonary Disease PNEUMONIA, ORGANISM NOS
Pulmonary Disease FUM/VAPOR UP RESP INFLAM
Pulmonary Disease ASTHMA, UNSPEC, W EXACERBATION
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Figure 27. Patient Movement Requests by Country of Origin 
 Figure 27 shows the frequency of aeromedical evacuations by country.  The DoD moved 
patients from 27 different countries, with Djibouti being the most prevalent.   
 
Figure 28. Patient Movement Requests by Destination 
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 Figure 28 shows the patients’ destination.  The majority of patients return to the 
Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, however, the DoD retains the ability to send a patient to an 
alternate destination if required.   
 
Figure 29. Number of Patient Movement Requests and Percent of Patient Movement Requests by Medical Specialty 
 Figure 29 shows the number of aeromedical evacuations by medical specialty.  The most 
frequent specialties were Internal Medicine, Orthopedic Surgery, and General Surgery.  In 
comparison, Sand, et al.’s (2010) study of civilian aeromedical evacuations found Internal 
Medicine, Surgery, and Neurology to be the top required specialties.  Figure 30 and Figure 31 
show the same information for Urgent and Priority patients.  As seen, the top specialties shift 
slightly based on precedence. 
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Figure 30. Number of Urgent Patient Movement Requests by Medical Specialty 
 
Figure 31. Number of Priority Patient Movement Requests by Medical Specialty 
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Figure 32 and Figure 33 show the breakdown of medical specialty required by country.  
These graphs show the disease profile evenly spread throughout Africa.  There is, however, an 
increased need for General Surgery and Neurosurgery in Libya as well as an increased need for 
Psychiatry in Djibouti as compared to other countries.    
 
Figure 32. Patient Movement Requests by Medical Specialty by Country of Origin 
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Figure 33. Patient Movement Requests by Medical Specialty by Country of Origin (Excluding Djibouti) 
Table 8 provides a list of the most common diagnosis.  This list is significantly different 
from that seen by Sand, et al.’s study (2010).  Sand, et al. (2010) found Neck Fracture, Stroke, 
MI, Cerbrocranial trauma, and Polytrauma as the top five diagnoses.  This difference may be in 
part to type of activities performed by patients as well as the age profile of the civilian and 
military populations.  However, Table 8 does show four MIs and 13 Chest Pains.  This fact 
suggests a commonality in cardiac problems between the two studies.  To note, many of these 
diagnosis occurred in a field environment without a medical doctor present. 
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Table 8. Frequency of Diagnosis (n=274; only diagnosis occurring more than once are shown) 
 
 
Diagnosis Count
CHEST PAIN, UNSPECIFIED 11
CALCULUS OF KIDNEY 6
ACUTE APPENDICITIS NOS 5
DVRTCULITIS OF COLON,WO HMRG 4
INJURY SCIATIC NERVE 4
MALARIA NOS 4
FX ANKLE NOS-CLOSED 3
OPEN WOUND OF HIP/THIGH 3
OTHER CONVULSIONS 3
DEPRESSIVE DISORDER NEC 3
GASTROINTEST HEMORR NOS 3
MI,OTHER SITE,UNSPEC EPISODE 2
VEN EMBL&THRMB,UNSPC DP VSL,LE 2
PNEUMONIA, ORGANISM NOS 2
ADJMT DISORD W DISTRBNCE,CNDCT 2
ABDOMINAL PAIN, GENERALIZ 2
AMPUTATION FINGER 2
PARTIAL EPIL,W IMP CON,WO INTR 2
CHEST PAIN NEC 2
SPONT TENS PNEUMOTHORAX 2
EPILEPSY NOS,WO INTR 2
INJ COMMON FEMORAL ARTER 2
ESOPHAGEAL DISORDER NOS 2
INJURY TO NERVE NOS 2
FEVER, UNSPECIFIED 2
MI,SUBENDCARD,UNSPEC EPISODE 2
FX LUMBAR VERTEBRA-CLOSE 2
PERITONSILLAR ABSCESS 2
FX NAVICULAR, WRIST-CLOS 2
PSYCH DISORDR W DELUSIONS, CCE 2
FX TIBIA NOS-CLOSED 2
SUICIDAL IDEATION 2
HAND INJURY NOS 2
HEAT STROKE SUNSTROKE 2
HYPHEMA 2
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Figure 34. Age Distribution by Medical Specialty (Middle:41-70 y, Young: 17-40 y) 
 Figure 34 shows the age distribution of the top required medical specialties.  Although 
only 21% of patients fall into the Middle age group, this category accounts for over 60% of 
Chest Pain and 50% of Diverticulitis of Colon diagnoses.   
 
Figure 35. Missions by Precedence 
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Although Figure 21 shows the number of Urgent and Routine patients to be equivalent, 
Figure 35  shows the number of Priority missions to be three times greater than the number of 
Routine or Urgent missions.  This difference is because only 19% of Priority and Urgent 
missions had more than one patient on board, where 58% of Routine missions had more than one 
patient.  This difference is likely due to the use of Routine missions as “theater clearing” 
missions, where planners evacuate borderline patients as a precautionary measure.   
 
Figure 36. Missions by Aircraft Segment 
 Figure 36 shows the DoD’s dependence on contracted civilian air ambulances for 
aeromedical evacuation in Africa.  Although this reliance is a point of concern for many 
planners, the partnership is successful in expanding military capability and capacity in the region 
without long-term commitments.  However, as seen in Figure 37, the recent trend is toward 
MilAir missions with fewer civilian air ambulances.  Perhaps, this trend is due to the increase in 
Routine patients moved via aeromedical evacuation as shown in Figure 23, but highlights the 
importance of this study as determining aircraft type is an important factor in reducing overall 
cost. 
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Figure 37. Missions by Aircraft Segment Over Time 
 
Figure 38. Missions by Litter Patient Count 
 Figure 38, Figure 39, and Figure 40 show the distribution of patient load by mission.  
Comparing these figures shows the majority of missions are for a single litter patient.  The 
maximum load experienced was a single mission with 22 patients.  These graphs demonstrate the 
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value of small aircraft like the C-21.  Not only are they less expensive to operate, but also handle 
the majority of mission requirements.  
 
Figure 39. Missions by Ambulatory Patient Count 
 
Figure 40. Missions by Patient Load 
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Figure 41. Missions by Special Team 
Figure 38 shows about 19% of missions require a Critical Care Air Transport Team.  
Together with Figure 26 and Table 7, they provide insight on the usefulness of a Tactical Critical 
Care Evacuation Team Enhanced capability for Africa.  In the past five-years, only 32 missions 
required Critical Care Air Transport Teams.  Of which, only a few would benefit from a Tactical 
Critical Care Evacuation Team Enhanced.  Even if a Tactical Critical Care Evacuation Team 
Enhanced flew all 32 missions, maintaining their currency would require additional training and 
expenses.  The Tactical Critical Care Evacuation Team Enhanced concept requires further 
analysis to justify this additional capability. 
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Figure 42. Missions by Country of Origin 
 While Figure 27 shows several patients came from Libya, Figure 42 shows most mission 
requirements generate from Sub-Saharan Africa.  This fact is significant because of the range 
limitations of MilAir flights that originate from Germany.  
 
Figure 43. Missions by Destination 
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 Figure 43 portrays a slightly different picture than Figure 28.  While the majority of 
missions are destined for the Landstuhl Regional Medical Center, this chart shows a significant 
portion of missions destined to South Africa.  This fact is understandable given the excellent 
medical care in South Africa and the large time differential between there and Germany.  
 
Figure 44. Missions by Aircraft Type 
Figure 44 breaks down the number of missions flown by each aeromedical evacuation 
platform.  While civilian air ambulances fly the majority of missions, C-17s fly more MilAir 
missions than C-130s or C-21s.  This fact highlights the demand for range and speed over price.  
The “C130/C21” category is a single mission that switched platforms en route.  The “G-III” 
category represents a single mission performed by an 86th aeromedical evacuation crew aboard a 
G-III aircraft that was on contract by AFRICOM HQ in Stuttgart.     
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Avoidable Costs 
 
Figure 45. Histogram of Avoidable Cost per Mission (Thousands $) 
 Figure 45 shows the frequency of the calculated avoidable cost per mission, broken into 
eight bins.  The mode is $143K with a range from $7K to $269K.  The mean is $133K with a 
standard deviation of $52K. 
 
Figure 46. Total Avoidable Cost per Year (Millions $) 
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Figure 46 shows the avoidable costs by year.  The total avoidable cost for aeromedical 
evacuation in Africa over the last five years was $22.6M or $4.5M per year.  Understanding 
these costs helps planners identify the cost/benefit of adding medical capability on the continent.  
If adding an additional surgeon in Djibouti reduces aeromedical evacuations by 10%, then the 
DoD can spend up to $450K on that capability each year.   
 
 
Figure 47. Avoidable Cost by Aircraft Segment per Year (Millions $) 
 Figure 47 separates the avoidable costs by civilian air ambulance versus MilAir.  Since 
2011, the cost of civilian air ambulances has declined while the cost of MilAir has increased.  
This raises the question of the appropriate mix of resource use.  Under the current system, MilAir 
has the right of first refusal, regardless of cost.  Figure 48 breaks down the MilAir portion by 
aircraft type.  This chart shows the increase in MilAir is due to an increased use of all aircraft 
types. 
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Figure 48. Avoidable Cost for MilAir by Aircraft Type per Year (Millions $) 
 
Figure 49. Avoidable Cost per Patient and per Mission each Year (Millions $) 
 Figure 49 shows the cost per patient and cost per mission each year.  While the average 
cost per mission is $133K, the average cost to move a patient is $109K.  The cost per mission 
increased from 2013 to 2014 while the cost per patient decreased.   
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Figure 50. Average Avoidable Cost per Mission by Precedence Over Time 
 Figure 50 shows the average mission costs broken down by precedence over time.  This 
figure shows an overall decreasing trend in the cost of Routine missions, a steady state for 
Priority missions, and an increase in the cost of Urgent Missions.  The average cost of a Routine 
mission is $120K, a Priority mission is $134K, and an Urgent mission is $144K. 
 
Figure 51. Total Avoidable Costs by Precedence Over Time 
82 
Figure 51 breaks down the total avoidable cost of aeromedical evacuation in Africa by 
precedence for each year.  This graphic shows that Priority patients consume a bulk of the cost 
and that the cost of Routine and Urgent patients is on the rise.  Over the five-year period, the 
DoD spent around $4M each on Routine and Urgent aeromedical evacuations and $14M on 
Priority aeromedical evacuations. 
Decision Map 
 This section shows the various aspects of the map tool, analyzes some of the findings, 
and provides an example of how to use the tool.  The visual aspect of the map tool revealed some 
unexpected analysis. 
Figure 52 shows the Urgent ranges for MilAir aircraft and their avoidable cost at their 
maximum range.  The costs represent the furthest each aircraft can fly and still move a patient 
within 12 hours.  The $17K, $63K, and $188K lines represent the C-21, C-130, and C-17. 
 
Figure 52. Urgent Range of C-21, C-130, and C-17 Respectively 
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 Similarly, Figure 53 represents the Priority ranges of MilAir, and the ability to move 
patients within 24 hours.  As seen, the C-21 and C-130 lines do not change because they are 
limited by their duty day.  However, the C-17 range extends to the $265K line due to its 24-hour 
duty day.   
 
Figure 53. Priority Range of C-21, C-130, and C-17 Respectively 
Combined, these two figures show a significant gap in coverage and capability of MilAir 
to provide adequate support in Africa.  The DoD does not have the organic ability to move an 
Urgent patient within the specified timeframe if they originate beyond the $188K line.  In 
addition, the DoD cannot move a Priority patient within the specified timeframe if they originate 
beyond the $265K line.  Figure 54 demonstrates the significance of this gap by overlaying the 
actual Urgent and Priority patient origins.  All but one Urgent patient movement location falls 
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beyond the capability of the DoD.  Furthermore, most of these Patient Movement Requests 
originate beyond the $63K line.  This line represents the range of a C-130, Ramstein’s home-
based aircraft.  Therefore, any movement beyond this line requires “borrowing” a C-17 from 
Tanker Airlift Control Center, which may or may not be available for support.  Without C-17 
support, the DoD cannot support most of the Priority requests as well.   
This analysis has several implications for planners.  By definition, CONPLANS execute 
in a contingent environment.  As such, the DoD relies solely on MilAir for aeromedical 
evacuation support.  Without civilian air ambulance support, most of Africa lacks coverage for 
Urgent patient movement requests.  Therefore, forward deployment of aeromedical evacuation or 
surgical capability is necessary to ensure proper medical support.  The same logic stands for 
Priority requests.  Although C-17s cover most of the continent, planners must understand the 
necessity of this aircraft for aeromedical evacuation when considering its capacity to perform 
other functions.  
 
Figure 54. Urgent (White Tear) and Priority (Blue Diamond) Patient Locations 
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 Furthermore, planners should be aware of the range limitations for “no-stop” 
requirements as dictated by the Validating Flight Surgeon.  Figure 55 shows the maximum range 
of a C-130J.  Djibouti, the location with the highest number of patient movements, lies outside 
that range.  Therefore, a “no-stop” requirement forces the use of a C-17, even for Routine 
patients. 
 
Figure 55. Empty Range of C-130J (2600nm) 
In a peaceful environment, the DoD has a more robust patient movement system.  As 
previously discussed, in order to fill the gaps in capability, the DoD uses civilian air ambulances.  
Figure 56 shows the four civilian air ambulance AORs.  The teardrop markers represent their 
home bases and the lines with the corresponding colors represent the approximate cost of moving 
a patient from that AOR.  These lines are similar to topographic lines, but with increasing costs 
rather than elevations.  As mentioned, the cost lines assume that any patient falling in the 
southern AOR flies to South Africa, while patients in other AORs fly to Germany.  This civilian 
air ambulance network can move patients from anywhere on the continent within the Urgent 
timeframe. 
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Figure 56. Civilian Air Ambulance AORs on Decision Map Tool 
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Figure 57. Civilian Air Ambulance AORs and Urgent (White Teardrop) and Priority (Blue Diamond) Patient Locations 
 As seen in Figure 57, civilian air ambulances are capable of reaching any patient within 
the prescribed timeline.  With this tool, it is easy to see that the South Africa civilian air 
ambulance responds to an Urgent request out of Zimbabwe for $50k.  At the same time, a MilAir 
flight to the same location cost over $265K and cannot meet the necessary timelines.  If the 
civilian air ambulance capability is unavailable, it is impossible to meet the requirements with 
the current MilAir system. 
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Figure 58. No-Stop Range of Civilian Air Ambulances (2300mi) 
 Similar to the C-130, the civilian air ambulances have limited fuel ranges.  Only if the 
patient falls within the ranges shown in Figure 58 can a civilian air ambulance handle a “no-
stop” requirement.  When compared to the patient locations in Figure 57, it is easy to see that 
many patient locations (to include Djibouti) fall outside these ranges.  As a result, either patients 
must endure additional stressors that occur during take-off and landing, or the DoD must use a 
C-17, its most expensive form of patient movement.  This fact stresses the limits of aeromedical 
evacuation capability in Africa, even with the civilian air ambulance capability. 
Map Tool Example  
Operationally, this tool provides a quick method of determining the lowest cost aircraft 
for aeromedical evacuation with a given set of criteria.  Figure 59 is an image of the map tool 
with all layers activated.  This figure shows that the cost of aeromedical evacuation varies widely 
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depending upon location and aircraft choice.  For an example, I use the highlighted white tear-
shaped marker, which represents an Urgent movement from Burkina Faso.  Immediately, I see 
this patient is beyond the range of the C-130 and C-21 Urgent capability, very close to the C-17 
boundary, and well within the Nigerian civilian air ambulance AOR.  
 
Figure 59. Aeromedical Evacuation Map Tool with All Layers Activated 
 Eliminating all other layers (Figure 60), I see the patient movement would cost over 
$188K with a C-17 and between $100K and $150K (yellow lines) for a civilian air ambulance.  
Given that this is a single patient and that the civilian air ambulance is more capable of moving 
the patient within the prescribed timeframe, this tool recommends the use of a civilian air 
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ambulance.  However, this location is beyond the “non-stop” range of the civilian air 
ambulances, so the plane requires a fuel stop en route.  To choose the appropriate aircraft, the 
decision maker must weigh this information against the quicker response time and lower cost of 
the civilian air ambulances.  Since each patient situation differs, the Map Tool defers to the 
Validating Flight Surgeon and The Aeromedical Evacuation Control Team to make the final 
decision. 
 
Figure 60. Western Civilian Air Ambulance AOR and Urgent C-17 Layers 
 The tool also provides information on past moves by selecting the corresponding marker.  
Figure 61 shows that a civilian air ambulance moved this patient over a 12 hours period with a 
destination of Landstuhl Regional Medical Center and a cost of $129K. 
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Figure 61. Patient Movement Information Example 
 
Decision Tree 
 In addition to the map tool, this research developed the following two decision trees.  The 
first tree is for Priority and Urgent patients.  The second tree is for Routine patients.  These tools 
identify the most cost efficient aircraft choice while abiding by Air Force and FAA regulations. 
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Priority/Urgent Decision Tree: 
1. What is the Precedence of the Patient Movement Request? 
a. If Urgent or PriorityGo to step 2 
b. If RoutineUse the Routine Tree (found on the following pages) 
2. Is the patient located in a contingent environment? 
a. If Yes 
i. Is the patient less than 1850 miles from Ramstein Air Base (C-130 
duty day range)? Go to step 3 
ii. Is the patient more than 1850 miles from Ramstein? Use a C-17  
(note: while this is the optimal choice, in this scenario, the system is 
incapable of reaching Urgent patients located further than 2500 miles 
or Priority patients further than 3900 from Ramstein) 
b. If Nogo to step 3 
3. How far is the patient located from Ramstein Air Base? 
a. Less than 1450 miles (C-21 duty day range)? Go to step 4 
b. Between 1450 miles and 1850 miles?Use a C-130 
c. More than 1850 miles? Go to step 6 
4. Does the 86th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron need to conduct training? 
a. If Yes Use a C-130 
b. If No/ Do Not Know Go to step 5 
5. How many patients need moved? 
a. Less than or equal to one litter  and two ambulatory patients Use a C-21 
b. More than one litter and two ambulatory patients Use a C-130 
6. Did the Validating Flight Surgeon mandate a No-Stop requirement? 
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a. If Yes Go to step 7 
b. If No Go to step 8 
7. How far is the patient located from Ramstein Air Base? 
a. Less than 2300 miles (civilian air ambulance fuel range)? Go to step 8 
b. Between 2300 miles and 3900 miles? Use a C-17  
(note: while this is the optimal choice, in this scenario, the system is incapable 
of reaching Urgent patients located further than 2500 miles from Ramstein) 
c. More than 3900 miles? Go to step 8 
(note: civilian air ambulances go to South Africa if located more than 3900 
miles from Ramstein.) 
8. How many patients need moved? 
a. Less than or equal to two litter and one Ambulatory patients? Use a Civilian 
Air Ambulance 
b. More than two litter and one Ambulatory patients? Use a C-17 
Routine Decision Tree (use only for Routine Patient Movements): 
1. Did the Validating Flight Surgeon mandate a No-Stop requirement? 
a. If Yes Go to step 2 
b. If No Go to step 3 
2. How far is the patient located from Ramstein Air Base? 
a. Less than 2300 miles (C-21 fuel range)? Go to step 3 
b. Between 2300 miles and 2600 miles (C-130 fuel range)? Use a C-130 
c. Between 2600 miles and 3900 miles? Use a C-17  
d. More than 3900 miles? Go to step 6 
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3. How many patients need moved? 
a. Less than or equal to one litter and two Ambulatory patients? Go to step 4 
b. More than one litter and two Ambulatory patients Use a C-130 
4. Is there space available on military aircraft already scheduled to move from Ramstein 
to the patient’s location and back? 
a. If YesUse space-a 
b. If No Go to step 5 
5. Does the 86th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron need to conduct training? 
a. If Yes Use a C-130 
b. If No Use a C-21 
6. Is the patient located in a contingent environment? 
a. If Yes use a C-17 
b. If No Go to step 7 
7. How many patients need moved? 
a. Less than or equal to two litter and one Ambulatory patients Civilian air 
ambulance to South Africa 
b. More than two litter and one Ambulatory patients Use a C-17 
 
Using these decision trees, I analyzed all 170 missions that occurred over the five-year 
period of the study.  In the analysis, I found 46 of the 170 missions (27%) used a less than 
optimal aircraft choice.  Only nine of which were due to the use of aircraft from CENTCOM (an 
option that was available in the past, but assumed to no longer be an option).  Broken down by 
precedence, I found a less than optimal aircraft chosen 24% of the time for Urgent missions, 16% 
of the time for Priority missions, and 64% of the time for Routine missions.  These results were 
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interesting since Routine missions have the longest planning horizon and should have the 
greatest ability to use the most appropriate aircraft.  Further analysis revealed that 23% of 
Routine missions used a C-130 when a C-21 was more appropriate.  In addition, 35% of Routine 
missions used civilian air ambulances when either a C-21 or C-130 was more appropriate.  Of 
the Urgent missions, 17% of them flew with a C-17 although a civilian air ambulance was more 
appropriate.   
 In addition, my analysis found cost savings on 40 of the 46 missions identified as a sub-
optimal aircraft choice.  On the remaining six missions, my decision tree recommended a more 
expensive aircraft as the optimal choice.  The total savings were $2.6M.  This is a savings of 
$520K each year or about $15K per mission.  Figure 62 shows the breakdown of these savings 
per year, revealing a significant rise in 2013 and 2014.   
 
Figure 62. Avoidable Cost Savings Estimates by Decision Tree Aircraft Changes 
Table 9 shows the list of differences in aircraft choice and cost between my model and 
the actual mission.  Of the 46 missions, eight resulted in savings of $100K or more per flight.  
The largest saving was on a Routine civilian air ambulance mission that moved two ambulatory 
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patients from the Seychelles in 2011.  This mission cost $267,105, but if flown by a C-21 would 
cost $53K.  Of the six missions that resulted in additional costs, one was a Priority mission to 
Agadir, Morocco for a single litter patient in 2014.  This location is on the border of the C-21 
range as defined by the decision tree.  The actual flight and ground time took 11:38.  Adding two 
hours for alert time brings the total time to 13:38, leaving only 00:22 on the duty day.  My model 
directs the use of a C-130.  Although costlier, the duty day is longer on a C-130, allowing for 
more ground time and time for any other complications.  Another mission that resulted in 
additional cost was an Urgent mission to Djibouti for two litter patients and two ambulatory 
patients.  This mission used a C-130, resulting in a total flight and ground time of 41:46.  From 
the time the plane took-off, over 30 hours elapsed before picking up the patient.  This timeframe 
does not meet the requirements for a Priority patient, much less an Urgent.  My model directed 
the use of a C-17.  While a C-17 could likely not move the patient within a 12-hour window, it 
has the duty day to reach the patient and return without remaining overnight.  In fact, of the six 
Urgent/Priority C-17 missions that flew from Ramstein to Djibouti, the average time to move the 
patient was around 13.5 hours, to include alert time, one leg of the flight, and ground time.  
However, as seen in Table 9, this additional capability comes at an estimated additional cost of 
$143K.  The third mission was a Priority C-21 mission to Djibouti.  This mission took over 40 
hours to return to Ramstein.  My tree recommended using a civilian air ambulance at an 
additional cost of $120K.  The next mission was a Priority C-17 to Djibouti in 2010.  The cost 
per flight hour for a C-17 was significantly lower in 2010, making this flight $3.7K cheaper than 
the civilian air ambulance suggested by my model.  The final two missions were C-17s that 
originated from Al Udeid Air Base.  My model does not consider using aeromedical evacuation 
teams from CENTCOM.  Therefore, it recommends using civilian air ambulances.    
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Table 9. Estimated Savings from Decision Tree Analysis 
 
Original Mode
 Original Avoidable 
Costs 
 Decision Tree 
Mode 
Decision Tree 
Avoidable Costs  Estimated Savings 
C017 268,976.77$               CAA 119,814.97$               149,161.80
C017 260,721.33$               CAA 158,617.61$               102,103.72
C017 256,083.97$               CAA 158,617.61$               97,466.35
C017 253,401.13$               CAA 158,617.61$               94,783.52
C017 249,532.67$               CAA 158,617.61$               90,915.05
C017 186,890.48$               CAA 158,617.61$               28,272.87
C017 175,713.70$               C-130 37,789.21$                 137,924.49
C017 172,449.12$               CAA 158,786.08$               13,663.04
C017 169,350.20$               CAA 134,852.49$               34,497.71
C017 165,016.00$               CAA 134,852.49$               30,163.51
C017 164,534.90$               CAA 134,852.49$               29,682.41
C017 153,985.70$               CAA 103,864.22$               50,121.48
C017 152,668.38$               CAA 158,786.08$               (6,117.70)
C017 143,797.80$               CAA 55,902.86$                 87,894.94
C017 129,129.23$               CAA 132,830.88$               (3,701.65)
C017 98,144.10$                 CAA 132,830.88$               (34,686.78)
C017 97,153.87$                 CAA 45,306.46$                 51,847.40
C017 84,029.37$                 C-130 40,986.75$                 43,042.62
C017 52,694.60$                 C-130 36,871.17$                 15,823.43
C130 127,718.97$               C-21 43,670.94$                 84,048.02
C130 126,895.60$               C-21 43,027.40$                 83,868.20
C130 122,088.80$               C-17 265,371.12$               (143,282.32)
C130 119,252.00$               C-21 43,027.40$                 76,224.60
C130 117,833.60$               C-21 43,027.40$                 74,806.20
C130 116,178.80$               C-21 43,027.40$                 73,151.40
C130 112,554.00$               C-21 43,670.94$                 68,883.06
C130 97,917.60$                 C-21 34,220.80$                 63,696.80
C130/C21 127,483.27$               C-21 43,670.94$                 83,812.32
C21A 37,828.30$                 CAA 158,617.61$               (120,789.31)
C21A 26,980.32$                 C-130 55,022.91$                 (28,042.60)
CAA 267,105.00$               C-21 52,667.87$                 214,437.13
CAA 184,620.00$               C-21 37,937.10$                 146,682.90
CAA 153,762.00$               C-130 114,804.57$               38,957.43
CAA 153,762.00$               C-21 41,429.62$                 112,332.38
CAA 143,600.00$               C-21 43,670.94$                 99,929.06
CAA 143,600.00$               C-21 43,670.94$                 99,929.06
CAA 143,600.00$               C-21 43,670.94$                 99,929.06
CAA 139,529.00$               C-21 38,807.08$                 100,721.92
CAA 136,160.00$               C-21 29,975.06$                 106,184.94
CAA 128,108.00$               C-21 37,513.61$                 90,594.39
CAA 122,982.00$               C-21 29,508.44$                 93,473.56
CAA 100,740.00$               C-130 78,259.83$                 22,480.17
CAA 42,600.00$                 C-130 31,649.48$                 10,950.52
CAA 39,307.00$                 C-21 17,060.79$                 22,246.21
CAA 21,070.00$                 C-21 10,142.73$                 10,927.27
G-III 81,528.15$                 C-21 41,429.62$                 40,098.53
Total 2,639,109.15
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Summary 
 This chapter gave a descriptive analysis of the patients, diseases, aircraft, timelines, and 
costs of aeromedical evacuation in Africa.  Of the 274 patients and 170 missions analyzed, there 
is a gap in aeromedical evacuation capability with over 23% of the Priority patients and almost 
10% of Urgent patients picked-up beyond the 24-hour mark.  In the worst case, it took seven 
days to move a Priority patient and five days to move an Urgent patient.  The DoD averaged 
$4.5M in avoidable costs each year to support aeromedical evacuation in Africa.  In spite of this 
expense, the map tool demonstrates large gaps in capability and the majority of patients falling 
within these gaps.  As a result, this map tool highlights the need for plans and efforts to mitigate 
the risks associated with the lack of aeromedical coverage.  Efficiently using the supplied current 
resources helps reduce this gap.  Applying the decision tree tool shows that efficient aircraft 
choice reduces cost by an average of $520K per year, freeing these funds to improve medical 
capability in Africa. 
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
 This chapter summarizes the study and highlights its most significant applications.  The 
chapter begins with a description of the significance of this research followed by 
recommendations for action as well as future research.  The chapter ends with a brief summary.  
Research Conclusions 
Africa is an extremely large continent with an increasing level of importance to the US.  
In the future, the DoD expects to perform more activities on this continent, without promise of 
additional medical capability.  As a result, the DoD must ensure the efficient use of available 
resources.  Identifying the epidemiology of aeromedical evacuation is a first step in 
understanding the best ways to minimize risk and meet requirements.  This study breaks down 
the aeromedical evacuation data from 2010 through 2014 by patient demographics, disease 
profiles, avoidable cost and aircraft type.  Implementing the proposed decision tree has the 
potential to reduce aeromedical evacuation costs in Africa by $520k each year.   
 Additionally, this study shows the DoD’s reliance on civilian air ambulances to fill 
significant gaps in capability.  All but one Urgent aeromedical evacuations fell outside the 
capability range of MilAir assets.  This gap is of special significance for CONPLANs where 
civilian air ambulances are not contractually required to operate.  Planners should understand and 
plan for these limitations in advance.  The map tool is a powerful resource to visualize the 
disparity in aeromedical evacuation coverage. 
100 
Significance of Research 
The decision tree and map tools have further implications as to facility location plans for 
CONPLANS, exercises, and long-term basing options.  By showing planners where the majority 
of aeromedical evacuation requirements exist and the current capability of aeromedical 
evacuation assets, planners can analyze potential sites according to their ability to provide 
medical coverage.  Additionally, planners can quickly see the need to task additional field 
medical/surgical and Medevac support.   
This study highlights the gaps in aeromedical evacuation response time and shows the 
importance of each Branch’s ability to provide initial response, surgical stabilization, and patient 
holding capabilities.  The importance of properly trained personnel in self-aid and buddy care 
and the initial response time to surgical intervention cannot be overstated.  One study shows that, 
“most battlefield casualties died of their injuries before ever reaching a surgeon” and that over 
24% of battlefield deaths were potentially preventable (Eastridge, et al., 2012 p. S431).  Planners 
must provide the needed support, rather than relying on aeromedical evacuation, especially in 
sub-Saharan Africa.     
 This study also highlights the cost of aeromedical evacuation and shows the true cost 
avoidance potential of minimizing the need for aeromedical evacuation.  By showing these costs, 
the DoD has an idea of how much it can spend on additional screening, capabilities, and training 
in order to reduce the incidence of aeromedical evacuation.  It also helps planners understand 
where to focus the majority of effort and resources in order to have the greatest impact.  The 
DoD can spend $450K each year to reduce aeromedical evacuations by 10% and break even. 
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Recommendations for Action 
This study recommends the implementation of the decision tools as a method of 
suggesting the most cost efficient aircraft for aeromedical evacuation.  In addition, this study 
recommends Service Components provide the necessary surgical stabilization and holding 
capability for operations and exercises in Africa.  As seen in this study, depending on 
aeromedical evacuation for medical coverage is not doctrinally correct or operationally feasible.  
Rather, each service must account for the gaps in aeromedical evacuation coverage and develop 
plans and resources that mitigate the risk.  Perhaps the DoD should implement a base-line metric, 
such as the time it takes to get personnel to surgery for a given level of risk.  Such a metric 
would drive medical funding, research, resources, training, and planning while maintaining equal 
risk across all Components of the DoD.   
This study also highlights a policy gap regarding aeromedical evacuation of civilian 
Government employees.  While deployed government employees are entitled to aeromedical 
evacuation, they do not have TRICARE, so there is no mechanism to provide civilian air 
ambulance support.  As a result, the DoD uses MilAir, which often has a slower response time at 
an increased cost.  The DoD would benefit from creating and funding a tool, such as a blanket 
purchase agreement with International SOS, that provides coverage to DoD civilians.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
This study highlights the need for further research into aeromedical evacuation 
precedence timeframes.  While research suggests time is a critical factor in survivability, the 
DoD does not understand the points where mortality and morbidity curves change slope.  The 
DoD should fund research to determine if moving a patient within 24 hours for a Priority or 72 
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hours for a Routine has significantly different outcomes as, for instance, 30 or 96 hours 
respectively.  Identifying these points through research will enable military planners and policy-
makers to allocate the limited supply of medical resources efficiently. 
Further research on the reasons why patients require aeromedical evacuation is necessary 
to understand what preventative screening/training to perform prior to deployment.  Preventing 
aeromedical evacuation not only minimizes financial impact, but also increases effectiveness of 
deployed units that need each member to be healthy and ready for duty. 
Additional research into the potential costs and benefits of a dedicated long-range, high-
speed aeromedical evacuation platform is necessary.  Procuring such an aircraft may prove cost 
effective and improve the DoD’s ability to provide aeromedical evacuation support in remote 
locations.  Additionally, this capability has the potential to extend the DoD’s strategic reach, 
power, and influence by allowing troops to deploy into remote locations with minimal risk and a 
small footprint. 
Summary 
 This chapter provides a summary of the study’s conclusions, significance, recommended 
actions, and recommended future research in regards to aeromedical evacuation in Africa.  With 
its expansive territory, numerous political borders, limited local capabilities, and widespread 
operations, Africa represents a challenge to aeromedical evacuation.  However, through evidence 
based research and planning, the DoD can reduce the overall risk to its personnel as it applies its 
available capabilities in the most effective and efficient manner. 
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Appendix A.  Map Tool User Guide 
 
The map tool is located at the following 
link: https://www.google.com/maps/d/edit?mid=z5Hd3poIUmss.kXRPqs41Avsw&usp=sharing 
and anyone with this link can access the tool for viewing and manipulation.  However, only 
Major Daniel Griffith has the ability to edit the information within the map.   
Once you arrive at the website, you will see the screen as shown in Figure 63.  From this 
screen, you can check the layers on the left side to display the information in which you are 
interested.   
 
Figure 63. Map Tool Opening Page 
. 
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Figure 64 provides an example using civilian air ambulances located in Nigeria.  This 
figure shows the area for which the Nigerian civilian air ambulances have responsibility and the 
approximate costs to move patients within this AOR.  
 
Figure 64. Map Tool Showing Nigerian AOR 
Figure 65 displays the area a C-17 can cover and still move a patient within the 
designated 12-hour Urgent window.  The map displays an avoidable cost of $188K for moving a 
patient at the frontier of this range.  
105 
 
Figure 65. Map Tool Showing C-17 Urgent Range 
 Clicking a layer on the map allows the user to see notes left by the editor.  For instance, 
Figure 66 displays a note that describes the highlighted AOR.  The note specifies that in order to 
have this range with a C-17, there is no tasking time remaining. 
 
Figure 66.  Map Tool Note Example 
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 Figure 67 displays the view shown by selecting the “Urgent Missions” layer.  This layer 
identifies the location of all Urgent missions completed between 2010 and 2014.  On the left, the 
tool shows a list of those missions by aircraft type.  On the right, the tool shows the locations 
from which the patient originated. 
 
Figure 67. Map Tool Urgent Missions Example 
Clicking on one of the markers on the left allows the user to see details of the mission.  
Figure 68 shows that the highlighted mission was for a single Critical Care patient from Djibouti, 
flown on a C-17.  This mission took 23.92 hours, which includes flight time, alert time, and 
ground time.  The mission incurred $256K in avoidable costs.  For military flights, the flight and 
ground times are the actual times while the alert times are standard according to Table 1.  For the 
civilian air ambulances, the flight times of the legs with the patients on board are the actual 
times.  For the legs without patients, I estimated the times based on the calculated distance and 
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speed of each AOR.  For ground times, I used the average ground time and the alert times are 
three hours. 
 
Figure 68. Map Tool Mission Details 
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Appendix B.  Storyboard 
 
  
109 
Bibliography 
 
Aéroport de Djibouti. "Airport Charges." 2015. 22 September 2015 <http://www.aeroport-
jib.com/index.php/en/pro-aero/redevance-aeroportuaires>. 
Affairs, AMC Public. August 2014. af.mil. 10 May 2015 
<http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/490683/air-mobility-
command-aeromedical-evacuation.aspx>. 
AFRICOM. "AFRICOM Command Brief 2014." 2014. africom.mil. 16 September 2015 
<www.africom.mil/newsroom/document/23774/africom-command-brief-2014>. 
AFRICOM. "AFRICOM Travel Map." 2015. africom.mil. 16 September 2015 
<http://www.africom.mil/newsroom/document/26566/africom-travel-map>. 
Aikins, A. "Tackling Africa's Chronic Disease Burden: from the Local to the Global." 
Globalization and Health 2010: 1. 
Air Force Cost Analysis Improvement Group. "AFI 65-503, Cost Factors Table A4-1." 2015. AF 
Portal. 22 September 2015 <https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-
af/USAF/ep/globalTab.do?channelPageId=s6925EC1350500FB5E044080020E329A9>. 
Air Mobility Command, Mission Management And Reliability Reporting System. AMCI 10-
202v6. Scott AFB: HQ AMC, 15 March 2011. 
American College of Surgeons. "Management of Complex Extremity Trauma." 2005. American 
College of Surgeons Committee on Trauma. 24 February 2016 
<https://www.facs.org/~/media/files/quality%20programs/trauma/publications/mancomp
exttrauma.ashx>. 
Apodaca, A., Olson, C., Jr., Bailey, J., Butler, F., Eastridge, B., and Kuncir, E. "Performance 
Improvement Evaluation of Forward Aeromedical Evacuation Platforms in Operation 
Enduring Freedom." Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 2013: S157-S163. 
Bayles, M. "Allocation of Scarce Medical Resources." Public Affairs Quarterly 1990: 1-16. 
Blow, O., Magliore, L., Claridge, J., Butler, K., and Young, J. "The Golden Hour and the Silver 
Day: Detection and Correction of Occult Hypoperfusion within 24 Hours Improves 
Outcome from Major Trauma." Journal of Trauma-Injury Infection & Critical Care 
1999, 7 ed.: 964. 
Boersma, E., Maas, A., Deckers, J., and Simoons, M. "Early Thrombolytic Treatment In Acute 
Myocardial Infarction: Reappraisal Of The Golden Hour." The Lancet 1996: 771-775. 
110 
Cecchine, G. and Hosek, S. Reorganizing the Military Health System. Should There Be A Joint 
Command? No. RAND/MR-1350-OSD. Santa Monica: Rand Corp 2001. 
Chawla, N. and Chawla, D. "Experiences with Transporting Stretcher Cases on Long Flights on 
Commercial Airlines." Air Medical Journal 2001: 24-27. 
CNN. "By the numbers: Women in the U.S. Military." 24 Jan 2013. cnn.com. 20 October 2015 
<http://www.cnn.com/2013/01/24/us/military-women-glance/>. 
Conklin & deDecker. 2016. conklindd.com. 2 February 2016 <https://www.conklindd.com/t-
Articlesaviationcostvariancehowaircraftcostsvarywithutilization.aspx>. 
Cowley, R., Hudson, F., Scanlan, E., Gill, W., Lally, R., Long, W., and Kuhn, A. "An 
economical and Proved Helicopter Program for Transporting the Emergency Critically Ill 
and Injured Patient in Maryland. J Trauma." Journal of Trauma and Acute Care Surgery 
1973: 1029-1038. 
Department of the Air Force. Aeromedical Evacuation Aircrew Training. AFI 11-2AEv1. 
Washington: HQ USAF, 17 May 2013. 
Department of the Air Force. Aeromedical Evacuation (AE) Operations Procedures. AFI 11-
2AEv3. Washington: HQ USAF, 15 August 2014. 
Department of the Air Force. C-130 Operations Procedures. AFI 11-2C-130v3. Washington: HQ 
USAF, 23 April 2012. 
Department of the Air Force. C-17 Operations Procedures. AFI 11-2C-17v3. Washington: HQ 
USAF, 16 November 2011. 
Department of the Air Force. C-21 Operations Procedures. AFI 11-2C-21v3. Washington: HQ 
USAF, 24 September 2010. 
Department of the Air Force. Critical Care Air Transport Team. AFTTP 3-42.51. Washington: 
HQ USAF, 7 April 2015. 
Department of the Air Force. Tactical Doctrine Aeromedical Evacuation. AFTTP 3-42.5. 
Washington: HQ USAF, 1 November 2003. 
Department of the Army. Army Health System. FM 4-02. Washington: HQ USA, 26 August 
2013. 
Department of Defense. Doctrine for Health Services Support in Joint Operations. JP 4-02. 
Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 26 April 1995. 
Department of Defense. Health Service Support. JP 4-02. Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 
October 2006. 
111 
Department of Defense. Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Patient Movement in Joint 
Operations. JP 4-02.2. Washington: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 30 December 1996. 
Department of Defense. Patient Movment. DODI 6000.11. Scott AFB: USTRANSCOM, 9 
September 1998. 
Department of Defense. Patient Movement. DODI 6000.11. Scott AFB: USTRANSCOM, 4 May 
2012. 
Duchateau, F., Verner, L., Cha, O., and Corder, B. "Decision Criteria of Immediate Aeromedical 
Evacuation." Journal of Travel Medicine 2009: 391-394. 
Eastridge, B., Mabry, R., Seguin, P., Cantrell, J., Tops, T., Uribe, P., Mallett, O., Zubko, T., 
Oetjen-Gerdes, L., Rasmussen, T., and Butler, F. "Death on the Battlefield (2001–2011): 
Implications for the Future of Combat Casualty Care." Journal of Trauma and Acute 
Care Surgery 2012: S431-S437. 
Essebag, V., Halabi, A., Churchill-Smith, M., and Lutchmedial, S. "Air Medical Transport of 
Cardiac Patients." Chest Journal 2003: 1937-1945. 
Federal Aviation Administration. 14 CFR Parts 117, 119, and 121. Washington D.C.: 
Department of Transportation 2011. 
Gates, R. Quadrennial Roles and Missions Review Report. Washington, DC: DoD 2009. 
Goldstein, A. "Infrastructure Development and Reculatory Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa." The 
World Economy 2001: 221-248. 
Hatzfeld, J., Dukes, S., and Bridges, E. "Innovations in the En Route Care of Combat 
Casualties." Annual Review of Nursing Research 2014: 41-62. 
Horder, P. "Airline Operating Costs." Managing Aircraft Maintenance Costs Conference. 
Brussels: SH&E 2003. 
International Civil Aviation Organization. "ICAO’s Policies on Charges for Airports and Air 
Navigation Services." Montréal: ICAO 2009. 
International Security Assistance Force Headquarters. "ISAF Overview Brief". National Harbor, 
Maryland: DTIC 2011. 
International SOS. "About Us." 2015. internationalsos.com. 11 May 2015 
<https://www.internationalsos.com/en/about-us.htm>. 
International SOS. "International SOS Re-Awarded the TRICARE Overseas Program Contract." 
22 May 2015. internationalsos.com. 21 September 2015 
112 
<https://www.internationalsos.com/newsroom/news-releases/international-sos-re-
awarded-the-tricare-overseas-program-contract-may-22-2015>. 
International SOS. "International SOS Facts and Figures." 3 February 2011. University of 
Cincinnati. 23 September 2015 
<https://www.uc.edu/content/dam/uc/international/docs/facts_and_figures_feb_11.pdf>. 
Kaplan, R. and Cooper, R. Cost & effect: Using integrated cost systems to drive profitability and 
performance. Harvard Business Press 1998. 
Malik, S. and Sullivan, W. "Impact of ABC Information on Product Mix and Costing Decisions." 
IEEE Transactions on Engineering Management 1995: 171-176. 
Martin, L. "How to Compare Costs Between In-House and Contracted Services." 1993. 
McLaren, G. "Government Nav, Airport, and Handling Fees." Professional Pilot 2007, June ed.: 
60-64. 
McLeary, P. "US Deployments to Africa Raise a Host of Issues." 2014. defensenews.com. 
December 2015 
<http://www.defensenews.com/article/20140503/DEFREG04/305030020>. 
Meza, J., Chen, L., Williams, T., Ullrich, F. and Mueller, K. "Differences in Beneficiary 
Assessments of Health Care Between TRICARE Prime and TRICARE Prime Remote." 
Military Medicine 2006: 950-954. 
Mullan, F., Frehywot, S., Omaswa, F., Buch, E., Chen, C., Greysen, S.R., Wassermann, T., 
Abubakr, D.E.E., Awases, M., Boelen, C., and Diomande, M.J.M.I. "Medical Schools in 
Sub-Saharan Africa." The Lancet 2011: 1113-1121. 
Naicker, S., Plange-Rhule, J., Tutt, R.C., and Eastwood, J. "Shortage of Healthcare Workers in 
Developing Countries--Africa." Ethnicity & Disease 2009: 60. 
Obama, B. US Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington: The White House 2012. 
Parsons, C. and Bobechko, W. "Aeromedical Transport: its Hidden Problems." Canadian 
Medical Association Journal 1982: 237. 
Rathmell, J. "What is Meant by Services?" Journal of Marketing 1966: 32-36. 
Richmond, J. "The Costs of Contracted Service: An Assessment of Assessments." MIT Center 
for Transportation Studies 1992. 
Rodriguez, D. United States Africa Command 2015 Posture Statement. Washington: Senate 
Armed Services Committee 2015. 
113 
SAF/FM. "A19-2 Active Air Force Standard Composite Rates by Grade." 2015. AF Portal. 22 
September 2015 <https://www.my.af.mil/gcss-
af/USAF/ep/contentView.do?contentType=EDITORIAL&contentId=c6925EC17709D0F
B5E044080020E329A9&programId=t6925EC2D4BC30FB5E044080020E329A9&chan
nelPageId=s6925EC1350500FB5E044080020E329A9>. 
Safavian, S. and Landgrebe, D. "A Survey of Decision Tree Classifier Methodology." West 
Lafayette: School of Electrical Engineering Purdue University 1990. 
Sand, M., Bollenbach, M., Sand, D., Lotz, H., Thrandorf, C., Cirkel, C., Altmeyer, P., and 
Georges Bechara, F. "Epidemiology of Aeromedical Evacuation: An Analysis of 504 
Cases." Journal of Travel Medicine 2010: 405-409. 
Schmidt, C. and Johnson, J. "Deployment of a Navy Expeditionary Medical Facility to the Horn 
of Africa." Disaster Management & Response 2005: 17-21. 
Stroud, M., Prodhan, P., Moss, M., and Anand, K. "Redefining the Golden Hour in Pediatric 
Transport." Pediatric Critical Care Medicine 2008: 435-437. 
Svan, J. "New Air Force concept for aeromedical evacuation to meet challenges in Africa." 26 
December 2013. stripes.com. 5 November 2015 <http://www.stripes.com/news/new-air-
force-concept-for-aeromedical-evacuation-to-meet-challenges-in-africa-1.259333>. 
Teichman, P., Donchin, Y., and Kot, R. "International Aeromedical Evacuation." New England 
Journal of Medicine 2007: 262-270. 
USTC. Transcom Regulating and Command and Control Evacuation System. 2015. 
trac2es.transcom.mil. 2015 <https://www.trac2es.transcom.mil>. 
Whitlock, C. "US Expands Secret Intelligence Operations in Africa." The Washington Post 
2012: 14. 
Wikipedia. "List of African Countries by Population." 2015. wikipedia.org.  5 October 2015 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_African_countries_by_population>. 
World Health Organization. "Working Together for Health." Geneva: WHO Press 2006. 
 
 
  
114 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE  Form Approved  OMB No. 0704–0188  
The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing 
data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or 
any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense, Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate 
for Information Operations and Reports (0704–0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202–4302. Respondents should be aware that 
notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to any penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it does not display a currently 
valid OMB control number. PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.  
1. REPORT DATE (DD–MM–YYYY)  
24-03-2016 
2. REPORT TYPE  
Master’s Thesis 
3. DATES COVERED (From — To) 
September 2014-March 2016 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE  
Epidemiology, Cost, And Aircraft Choice For Aeromedical 
Evacuation In AFRICOM 
 
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER  
5b. GRANT NUMBER  
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER  
6.  AUTHOR(S) 
Griffith, Daniel, A, Major 
 
5d. PROJECT NUMBER  
 
5e. TASK NUMBER  
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER  
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  
Air Force Institute of Technology  
Graduate School of  Engineering and Management (EN)
2950 Hobson Way  
WPAFB OH 45433-7765  
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER 
AFIT-ENS-MS-16-M-105 
 
9. SPONSORING / MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)  
 
Intentionally Left Blank 
 
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)  
 
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT 
NUMBER(S)  
12. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT  
Distribution Statement A. Approved for Public Release;Distribution Unlimited 
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  
This work is declared a work of the U.S. Government and is not subject to copyright protection in the United 
States.      
14. ABSTRACT  
A significant shortfall exists in the medical capability provided to US Service members deployed to the African 
Area of Responsibility because of unknown epidemiology, large distances, limited resources, and high patient 
movement cost.  The first step in closing this gap is to understand the types, demographics, diagnoses, and 
distribution of the patients requiring aeromedical evacuation.  This research examined the DoD’s aeromedical 
evacuation missions from Africa between 2010 and 2014.  Of the 274 patients and 170 missions identified from 
available data, a gap is evident in aeromedical evacuation capability with over 23% of Priority patients and 
almost 10% of Urgent patients picked-up beyond the critical 24-hour mark.  A decision tree and web-based 
decision support tool are proposed that identified improper airlift choice in 46 of the 170 missions examined.  
These decisions cost the DoD $2.6M.  Making better aeromedical movement decisions can enable the DoD to 
reallocate funds to reduce the existing medical gap in Africa. 
 
15. SUBJECT TERMS 
Aeromedical Evacuation Africa AFRICOM Medevac 
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF:  17. LIMITATION 
OF ABSTRACT  
 
 
UU 
18. NUMBER 
OF PAGES  
 
  
128 
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON 
Dr. Alan W. Johnson, , AFIT/ENS 
a. 
REPORT 
 
U 
b. 
ABSTRACT 
 
U 
c. THIS 
PAGE 
 
U 
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include Area Code) 
alan.johnson@afit.edu  
(937)-255-3636 x 4703 
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8–98)  
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39.18  
